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For decades, corporate law scholars insisted on a simple
division of responsibilities. Corporations were told to focus
exclusively on maximizing financial returns to shareholders
while the government tended to all other concerns by
adopting new regulations. As reformers challenged this
orthodoxy by urging corporations to take action on pressing
social problems, defenders of the status quo have responded
by suggesting that these efforts could be dangerous. In their
view, internal corporate governance reforms could interfere
with the adoption of external governmental regulations that
would be more effective. The hypothesis that reformers face
a stark choice between pursuing internal corporate changes
and pursuing new external regulations is playing an
increasingly important role in the corporate law literature, but
it has not been subjected to meaningful analysis.
This Article seeks to fill that gap. After isolating the stark
choice hypothesis, the Article unpacks and challenges the
assumptions that drive it. There is no clear constraint that
forces a choice between internal and external reforms, and
there are good reasons to believe that an internal strategy is
more likely to generate valuable change. Internal reforms can
also lay the groundwork for external reforms, as corporations
cease to resist or even actively support new regulations.
Analyzing these dynamics can yield new insights into efforts
to improve corporate outcomes on issues like racial justice
and climate change.
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Introduction
Corporate law has been wracked by a decades-long debate. A
majority of academics and practitioners support shareholder primacy, the
view that corporations exist solely to generate financial returns for
shareholders. But an increasingly vocal minority supports stakeholder
governance, the view that corporate leaders should consider the interests of a
broader range of stakeholders, including workers, consumers, and members
of surrounding communities. Shareholder primacy theorists have long
claimed that stakeholder governance would be costly or ineffective in
advancing the interests of stakeholders. But they have recently escalated their
attacks by insisting that stakeholder governance rhetoric is potentially
dangerous to stakeholders: eminent commentators have suggested that
adopting corporate governance measures to promote stakeholder interests
could “derail,” “crowd out,” “impede,” “cannibalize” or otherwise prevent
governmental reforms and regulations that would do more to advance
stakeholders’ interests.1
The hypothesis that reformers face a stark choice between internal
corporate governance reforms and external regulations plays an important
See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver
Value to All Stakeholders?, 75 Vand. L. Rev. --- (forthcoming 2022) (suggesting that
1

corporate pledges to support stakeholders are “counterproductive” because they
“deflect outside pressures to adopt governmental measures that would truly serve
stakeholders”); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom
Corporate Leaders Bargain, 93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1467, 1471 (2021) (“acceptance of
stakeholderism would be counterproductive: rather than protecting stakeholders,
stakeholderism would serve the private interests of corporate leaders by increasing
their insulation from shareholder oversight and would raise illusory hopes that could
deflect pressures to adopt laws and regulations protecting stakeholders”); Matteo
Gatti & Chrystin D. Ondersma, Stakeholder Syndrome: Does Stakeholderism
Derail Effective Protections for Weaker Constituencies?, 100 N.C. L. Rev. 101, 104
(2021) (describing “concerns over the fact that stakeholderism could be used as both
a shield and a sword: corporations could use it to defend the status quo and interfere
with opportunities to achieve reforms that would shift power and resources to
weaker constituencies via direct regulation”); Mark J. Roe & Roy Shapira, The
Power of the Narrative in Corporate Lawmaking, 11 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 233, 267
(2021) (suggesting that “short-termism” narrative could “Crowd Out Good
Policymaking”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of
Stakeholder Governance, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 91, 171-78 (2020) (“Stakeholderism
Would Impede Reforms”); Matteo Gatti & Chrystin Ondersma, Can a Broader
Corporate Purpose Redress Inequality? The Stakeholder Approach Chimera , 46
J. Corp. L. 1, 63-70 (2020) (“A Stakeholder Approach Is Likely Detrimental to
Redressing Inequality”). For a similar set of claims in the popular press, see Kim
Phillips-Fein, I Wouldn’t Bet on the Kind of Democracy Big Business is Selling Us,
N.Y. Times (Feb. 1, 2022) (“The ideal of an easy symbiosis between public and
private sectors would undermine the kinds of political mobilizations, however
difficult to organize and enact, that are needed for reform that benefits most
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role in the case against stakeholder governance. Workers and other
stakeholder constituencies have plainly suffered in the past few decades. 2
Stakeholder governance is a movement born of desperation over the plight
of these constituencies, and pessimism about the likelihood of effective and
helpful government intervention. The stark choice hypothesis seeks to play
one concern against the other.
It is also one of the few arguments for shareholder primacy that would
resonate with people focused on stakeholder interests. Critics of stakeholder
governance-based reforms sometimes claim that they may be destructive
because they would prevent corporate acquisitions and other transactions that
would create economic value.3 But stakeholder governance theorists are
Americans.”); Cam Simpson, Akshat Rathi & Saijel Kishan, The ESG Mirage,
Bloomberg Businessweek (Dec. 13, 2021) (reporting sentiment that “the emphasis
on” Environmental Social and Governance concerns at corporations “has delayed
and displaced urgent action needed to tackle the climate crisis and other issues”);
Tunku Varadarajan, Can Vivek Ramaswamy Put Wokeism Out of Business, Wall
St. J. (June 25, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-vivek-ramaswamy-putwokeism-out-of-business-11624649588 (suggesting that corporations have offered
“woke” arguments on issues that are not central to their operations to distract from
issues that are central). Similar concerns have also begun to affect the debate over
Jack Balkin’s “information fiduciaries” proposal, in which companies like Facebook
would have an obligation to use user data in ways that advance user interests. See
Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133
Harv. L. Rev. 497, 537 (2019) (“we suspect that the fiduciary approach, if pursued
with any real vigor, would tend to cannibalize rather than complement
procompetition reforms”).
Somewhat more subtly, former Delaware Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr. has
suggested that current corporate law does not allow meaningful consideration of
stakeholder interests, and that misunderstanding this aspect of current corporate law
could impede adoption of external and internal reforms. Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Corporate power is corporate purpose I: evidence from my hometown, 33 Oxford
Rev. of Econ. Pol. 176, 177 (2017) (“By continuing to suggest that corporate boards
themselves are empowered to treat the best interests of other corporate
constituencies as ends in themselves, no less important than stockholders, scholars
and commentators obscure the need for legal protections for other constituencies
and other legal reforms that empower these constituencies and give them the means
to more effectively protect themselves.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial:

The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability
Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 Wake Forest

L. Rev. 761 (2015). Chief Justice Strine’s position suggests that certain pathways to
internal reform – such as advocating for corporate consideration of stakeholder
interests without pressing for legal changes – could endanger external reforms.
2
See, e.g., Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker

Power Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American
Economy, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 63 (Spring 2020).
E.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1 at 164-68; Gatti & Ondersma,
Stakeholder Approach Chimera, supra note 1 at 63-64 & n.365.
3
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likely to accept some loss of economic value to deliver benefits to
stakeholders.4 Only a threat to stakeholder interests is likely to be persuasive.
Similarly, critics of stakeholder governance claim that it may not deliver the
intended benefits.5 But that concern alone is not a reason to preclude
experimentation with such reforms, especially after decades in which
shareholders enjoyed outsized gains and other corporate constituencies
suffered deeply while external regulators did little to help. In order to explain
why stakeholder governance should not be pursued, shareholder primacy
theorists must explain why it would be risky to try. The stark choice
hypothesis plays that necessary role in the rhetoric of shareholder primacy
theorists.
Despite its enormous importance, the hypothesis that reformers face
a stark choice between two exclusive strategies has not been subjected to
serious critical analysis. A more careful look reveals that the hypothesis is
undertheorized and difficult to square with experience. Like much of the
traditional law and economics literature, the hypothesis ignores important
realities about the costs of political action.6 There is no reason to believe that
the choices are mutually exclusive: there is no clear constraint that forces a
choice between the internal and external paths.7 There is little reason to
assume that reformers are biased or naive in their expectations: reformers are
often sophisticated to the point of cynicism, and are unlikely to overestimate
the value of an internal reform or to trade away an achievable external reform
that would be more effective.8 And there is no reason to believe that the
choices carry fixed political costs: internal reforms could reshape the way that
corporations use their formidable political capital with respect to external
reforms, making external reforms more likely.9
Stakeholder governance theorists have not pressed this case, perhaps
because many are not eager to encourage governmental action.10 But once
Cf. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in
Law and Economics, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 1051, 1071-72 (2016) [hereinafter Fennell
& McAdams, Distributive Deficit] (noting that different social welfare functions may
4

weigh distributive gains and efficiency differently).
5
Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1; Gatti & Ondersma, Stakeholder
Approach Chimera, supra note 1.
6
See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Inversion Aversion, 86 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 797, 805-07 (2019); Fennell & McAdams, Distributive Deficit, supra
note 4 at 1051.
7
See infra Part II.A.
8
See infra Part II.B.
9
See infra Part II.C.
10
See Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance: The New Paradigm, Harv. L.
Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporate-governance-the-newparadigm/ (suggesting that stakeholder governance paradigm could “forge a
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the stark choice hypothesis is identified and inverted to match reality, it
becomes possible to evaluate opportunities to effect real change through
internal corporate governance reforms.
Apart from filling a gap in the literature, the discussion also
illuminates the somewhat confusing corporate law discourse on political
process. Supporters of shareholder primacy are sometimes profoundly
optimistic about how effective government can be in addressing problems,
suggesting that corporate leaders can focus on shareholder profits because
government officials will tend to all other issues. 11 On other occasions they
are implicitly pessimistic, suggesting that corporations can harm stakeholders
for long periods of time without the government interfering in a way that
affects profitability.12 Supporters of stakeholder governance are similarly torn
between deep pessimism about the government’s ability to address

meaningful and successful private-sector solution, which may preempt a new wave
of legislation and regulation”); Simpson, Rathi & Kishan, supra note 1 (quoting
MSCI chairman and CEO Henry Fernandez as saying that investors should embrace
social goals “to protect capitalism. Otherwise, government intervention is going to
come, socialist ideas are going to come.”). Cf. Martin Lipton, et al., Professor
Bebchuk’s Errant Attack on Stakeholder Governance, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp.
Governance
&
Fin.
Reg.
(Mar.
4,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/04/professor-bebchuks-errant-attack-onstakeholder-governance/ (corporate governance legislation like that proposed by
Elizabeth Warren is “unnecessary if companies and investors embrace stakeholder
capitalism”).
11
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. Corp. L. 637, 668 (2006) (“The justification for granting
courts a specialized role in protecting shareholder interests vis-à-vis those of other
corporate stakeholders, is one of institutional competence. The markets and the
political process generally function well with respect to other corporate
stakeholders.”); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various

Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate
Fiduciary Duties, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 23, 42-43 (1991) (“If the actions of a firm are

genuinely detrimental to a local community, the members of that community can
appeal to their elected representatives in state and local government for redress. . . .
[L]ocal communities should be able to mobilize into an effective political coalition
to press for protection from harmful actions by corporations.”).
12
For example, a group of prominent commentators has urged that there is a
significant difference between attention to the long term interests of a corporation
and attention to externalities and distributional concerns. See Mark J. Roe, et al.,
The Sustainable Corporate Governance Initiative in Europe, 38 Yale J. on Reg. Bull.
133, 136 (2021), https://www.yalejreg.com/bulletin/the-sustainable-corporategovernance-initiative-in-europe/ (suggesting that there is a distinction between the
problem of short time horizons and the problem of externalities). Presumably, if
the government is effective, corporations will be forced to bear the costs of
externalities in the long run.
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problems,13 and an apparently strong belief in the capacity of government
regulators.14 A careful look at the processes for internal and external reform
can throw some light on a debate that is normally characterized more by heat.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I identifies and contextualizes
the stark choice hypothesis, situating it in broader concepts from law and
economics. Part II presents evidence from current debates and historical
reforms suggesting that the stark choice hypothesis is not true. Part III applies
the analysis to live areas of debate, including social justice and climate change,
and considers potential counterexamples that suggest the potential scope and
limits of the stark choice argument.
I.

The Stark Choice Hypothesis in Context

This Part identifies and contextualizes the stark choice hypothesis.
Part I.A describes the stark choice hypothesis and its role in criticisms of
stakeholder governance. It also contextualizes the position by observing that
theories about how corporate governance ought to work ultimately depend
on ideas about how the actual government really does work. 15 Part I.B shows
that the stark choice hypothesis is a cousin of theories in the law and
economics literature, and discusses emerging criticisms of those theories.
A.

The Stark Choice Hypothesis in the Corporate Governance
Literature

Corporate scholars and practitioners have vigorously debated
whether corporations should be managed to deliver benefits to shareholders
alone, or with a view to a broader range of stakeholder interests. In a wave
of recent scholarship, shareholder primacy advocates have given central
significance to a claim that reformers must choose between orienting
corporations toward stakeholders through internal corporate governance
See, e.g., Larry Fink, 2019 Letter to CEOs: Profit & Purpose, BlackRock
(2019), https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore/en/2019-larry-fink-ceo-letter
(suggesting that move toward stakeholder governance is based in part on “the failure
of government to provide lasting solutions” to “fundamental economic changes”);
Tim Wu, The Goals of the Corporation and the Limits of the Law, The CLS Blue
Sky Blog (Sep. 3, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/09/03/the-goalsof-the-corporation-and-the-limits-of-the-law/ (“one reason there is so much
mounting pressure for corporations to take action today is that government has failed
to act in many areas that people care about, often by overwhelming margins”).
14
For example, Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act
would impose a stakeholder approach to corporate governance and provide
extremely broad grants of authority to regulators.
15
Cf. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. Corp. L. 99
(2008) (situating the Berle-Dodd debate over corporate purpose in the New Deal
debates about the role of government).
13
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mechanisms and encouraging corporations to behave better through external
regulation.16
The conventional view is that the directors and officers of a for-profit
corporation have a responsibility to manage the corporation for the benefit
of its shareholders, while the government tends to all other social interests by
setting taxes and monetary penalties so that profit-seeking corporations
undertake the right activities.17 On this account, internal corporate
mechanisms should only serve shareholders, while all others in society are
protected by external regulations. But a strong insurgency has argued that
directors and officers should have the power and responsibility to manage the
corporation for the benefit of everyone affected by its actions.18 This concept
of stakeholder governance has gained increasing traction in the marketplace,
even as a vigorous academic debate continues to rage. 19
In an admirably clear statement supporting shareholder primacy and
summarizing the choice, Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledged that firms
could be made to consider a broad range of social interests. But they
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Standard citations in support of this principle include Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”), and Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) (directors
and officers can consider stakeholder interests if and only if there are “rationally
related benefits accruing to the stockholders”). There is a vast academic literature
discussing this principle, including Strine, Dangers of Denial, supra note 1 at 768
(“Despite attempts to muddy the doctrinal waters, a clear-eyed look at the law of
corporations in Delaware reveals that, within the limits of their discretion, directors
must make stockholder welfare their sole end, and that other interests may be taken
into consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder welfare.”), and Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo.
L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001) (describing “growing consensus” that “managers of the
corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in the
interests of its shareholders”).
18
There is a vast academic literature on the stakeholder governance
perspective. A lucid though opinionated summary of the issues can be found in
Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First
Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public (2012).
19
For examples of statements in support of stakeholder governance by
prominent business people and organizations, see, e.g., Larry Fink, Profit &
Purpose:
2019
Letter
to
CEOs,
Blackrock
(2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore/en/2019-larry-fink-ceo-letter;
Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, Business Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-ofa-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans; Martin Lipton,
Corporate Governance: The New Paradigm, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporate-governancethe-new-paradigm/.
16
17
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suggested that firms should be made to focus on shareholder profit
maximization while other institutions manipulate their operating
environment or redistribute their profits to serve other ends:
Given wealth as a maximand, society may change
corporate conduct by imposing monetary penalties.
These reduce the venturers’ wealth, so managers will
attempt to avoid them. A pollution tax, for example,
would induce the firm to emit less. It would behave
as if it had the interests of others at heart. Society thus
takes advantage of the wealth-maximizing incentives
built into the firm in order to alter its behavior at least
cost. . . . Society must choose whether to conscript the
firm’s strength (its tendency to maximize wealth) by
changing the prices it confronts or by changing its
structure so that it is less apt to maximize wealth. The
latter choice will yield less of both good ends than the
former.20
Statements like this are characterized by inattention to the manner in
which society makes its choice between external regulations directed at
“prices” and internal reforms directed at “structure.” This inattention is
arguably a useful defensive measure, as the political process has often failed
to deliver changes to the prices confronted by profit-seeking corporations in
a way that would protect the interests of societal stakeholders. 21
This defensive indifference has escalated into offensive assertions
about the political process. A wave of recent scholarship has advanced the
claim that reformers face a stark choice between the pursuit of internal
corporate governance reforms and the pursuit of more effective external
regulations. The purpose of this claim is to suggest that advocacy for
stakeholder governance is affirmatively dangerous to stakeholder interests.
The mechanisms identified and depth of coverage vary. In their
recent critique of stakeholder governance, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and
Roberto Tallarita suggest that stakeholder governance reforms have the
potential to “impede” reforms that would be more effective.22 In a brief
discussion, they suggest four mechanisms that might have this effect: (1)
reformers may devote resources to urging internal reforms when those
resources might have been better spent on urging external reforms, 23 (2)
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 37-38 (1991); see also Macey, supra note 11.
21
See Fink, supra note 13; Wu, supra note 13.
22
Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1 at 171.
23
Id. at 171-72.
20
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reformers seeking external changes might be less able to attract support from
potential donors, employees and volunteers who believe that an underlying
problem has been solved by internal reforms,24 (3) policymakers may be less
receptive to advocacy for external reforms if they believe less painful internal
changes have solved the problem,25 and (4) stakeholder governance could be
used strategically by corporate actors to defeat external regulations. 26
In an article asserting that stakeholder governance would do little to
address wealth inequality, Professors Matteo Gatti and Chrystin Ondersma
provide a lengthier argument for the stark choice hypothesis, based on two
mechanisms:27 (1) corporations may be able to lobby more effectively on
behalf of their shareholders or managers if they can claim to be acting on
behalf of a broader range of social stakeholders, and (2) the internal
stakeholder governance approach could consume political capital and
attention that would otherwise be used for external reforms.
In a related draft article on the rise of narratives about short termism,
Professors Mark Roe and Roy Shapira offer a detailed and insightful account
of the way that powerful forces had sold a story that stock market shorttermism was responsible for various social ills.28 But they offer only two
paragraphs of reasoning in support of their claim that “Powerful Narratives
Can Crowd Out Good Policymaking.”29 Without citation, they simply assert
that strong stories can obtain “a higher priority on lawmakers’ crowded policy
agenda,” and “may well take policymakers, the media, and the public’s eyes
from more” important problems and better solutions.30
Some of these arguments have earlier antecedents in the literature.31
For example, in a 2008 working paper, Robert Reich outlined a case against
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 172.
Id.
Id. at 173.

Gatti & Ondersma, Stakeholder Approach Chimera, supra note 1.
Roe & Shapira, supra note 1.
Id. at 267-68.

Id.

Though it is somewhat removed from the debate between stakeholder
governance and shareholder primacy, Professor Urska Velikonja has argued that
when corporate scandals make a legislative response inevitable, investors have
historically channeled the response toward requirements that corporate boards
include independent directors, thus defeating regulations that would be more
consequential. See Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board
Independence, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 855 (2014). Professor Velikonja’s analysis is
premised on the idea that the independent board members would maximize
shareholder value, and therefore would do little to improve social welfare. See id.
at 901. It is also unclear that better external regulations could have been obtained
after the corporate scandals she analyzes. Accounting or financial scandals that
damage shareholder value may well call for internal as opposed to external
31
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corporate social responsibility that focused on the proper allocation of roles
across corporations and democratically accountable political institutions. 32
Reich asserted that an emphasis on corporate social responsibility would
detract from more meaningful external reforms, which could only come
through ordinary politics. The assertion was based on claims that: (1)
pessimism about the likelihood of external reform was not justified and could
become “a self-fulfilling prophesy,”33 (2) optimism about the likelihood of
internal reform was not justified because consumers and investors would not
pay for better corporate behavior,34 (3) corporate social responsibility debates
blur responsibility and prevent the public from holding politicians
accountable for the failure of external reform,35 (4) corporate social
responsibility initiatives give employees, customers, investors, and the public
a false sense of accomplishment, 36 and (5) corporations can deploy temporary
concessions strategically to prevent meaningful and lasting reform. 37
Though these arguments are somewhat undertheorized, they share a
common structure.
First, they share an underlying assumption that reformers and the
political process can only produce a limited amount of reform. Some
constraint — limited political capital, limited time and attention by key players,
or limited capacity to tolerate large amounts of change — is thought to make
it necessary for reformers to choose between different options. Without this
assumption, there would be no need to choose between internal and external
strategies.
Second, they share an assumption that key players will fail to properly
evaluate reforms. Either reformers will act based on mistaken beliefs about
the relative efficacy of internal and external reforms, or they will settle for
weak internal reforms when strong external reforms were obtainable.
Reformers, or the public, are similarly assumed to believe that an ineffective
or temporary corporate concession is sufficient to make an external reform
unnecessary. Without this assumption, there would be little reason to fear

reforms. And Congress responded to the bribery scandals of the 1970s with the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. While that act contains provisions relating to
corporate governance, it also takes an external approach and authorizes monetary
fines for violations.
32
Robert B. Reich, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility,
Goldman School Working Paper Series GSP08-003 (Aug. 1, 2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1213129.
33
Id. at 4.
34
Id. at 13.
35
Id. at 5.
36
Id. at 5-6.
37
Id. at 33.
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efforts to put potential internal reforms on the table; weak reforms will only
be adopted if stronger measures could not be pushed through.
Third, they do not engage with potential differences in political costs,
or dynamic effects. Beyond simple assumptions that external reforms are
possible,38 there is little discussion of the relative likelihood that either type of
reform would be adopted, or the impact that adoption of internal reforms
might have on the adoption of external reforms. Instead of wrestling with a
dynamic process, in which reforms impact the feasibility of further reforms,
they treat the issue as a simple one time choice with two options available.
These claims sit uncomfortably with the broader theory of
shareholder primacy, which assumes that government officers will defend
stakeholder interests. If corporate leaders focus exclusively on maximizing
shareholder profits, third parties will suffer unless the government imposes
taxes and penalties that align shareholder profits and social welfare. 39 As a
result, the assumption of an effective government that acts appropriately to
prevent socially-destructive conduct continues to play an important role in
the shareholder primacy perspective. As discussed below, these claims are
also subject to challenge in their own right. 40
B.

Related Claims in the Law and Economics Literature

The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics holds that under
certain strong assumptions such as the existence of complete markets, trading
will naturally drive the economy to an optimal equilibrium in which no one
can be made better off without making someone else worse off.41 The second
fundamental theorem of welfare economics holds that under certain stronger
assumptions, any desired optimal equilibrium can be achieved by
redistributing wealth then allowing markets to pursue efficiency.42
Laundered versions of these theoretical claims are endemic in the law
and economics literature. Echoing the second fundamental theorem of
E.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1 at 174 (“To be
sure, our analysis is based on the premise that the possibility of stakeholderprotecting reforms is not completely blocked.”); Fisch, supra note 11; Macey, supra
note 11.
39
See, e.g., Macey, supra note 11; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20 at 39
(“We do not make the Panglossian claim that profit and social welfare are perfectly
aligned. When costs fall on third parties—pollution is the common example—firms
do injury because harm does not come back to them as private cost.”).
40
See infra Part II.
41
See Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston & Jerry R. Green,
Microeconomic Theory 326 (1995) (“If the price p* and allocation (x1*, . . . xI*, q1*,
. . . qJ*) constitute a competitive equilibrium, then this allocation is Pareto optimal.”).
42
See id. at 327 (“For any Pareto optimal levels of utility (u1*, . . . , uI*), there
are transfers of the numeraire commodity (T1, . . . , TI) . . . such that a competitive
38
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welfare economics, Professors Kaplow and Shavell have famously argued that
the government should focus exclusively on efficiency when designing legal
rules, and should use tax and transfer schemes to redistribute wealth as
needed to achieve the desired outcome.43
This tidy separation of issues closely resembles the suggestion that
internal corporate governance rules should be designed with an exclusive
focus on efficiency, and external regulations and taxes should be used as
needed to direct the economy toward a desired outcome.44 Instead of
adopting an inefficient corporate governance rule calling on firms to care for
workers, the government could simply transfer wealth to workers until they
demand better conditions, or adopt regulations that match what the workers
would demand in those circumstances.45
Criticism of this line of thinking can come from two directions. First,
ideas like the fundamental theorems of welfare economics only hold true in
a specific imagined environment that includes features like complete markets.
These conditions are not present in the real world. Indeed, the rules of
corporate governance exist precisely because of imperfections in markets. 46
Second, even if a benevolent social planner could theoretically
separate and separately optimize measures directed at redistribution and
efficiency, actual governments do not do so. This has implications for
equilibrium reached from the endowments . . . yields precisely the utilities (u 1*, . . .
, uI*).”).
43
See Fennell & McAdams, Distributive Deficit, supra note 4 at 1065 & n.42;
David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 439 (2003); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is
Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667,
677 (1994) (“Redistribution is accomplished more efficiently through the income tax
system than through the use of legal rules, even when redistributive taxes distort
behavior.”).
44
Compare id. with Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1 at
167 (Stakeholderism “would be obviously bad for shareholders. Furthermore, by
hurting corporate performance and the economic value produced by corporations,
these managerial inefficiencies would also reduce the aggregate wealth available to
society as a whole. If the economic pie produced by the corporate sector become
smaller, all who benefit from slices of it (whether contractually, through tax revenues,
or due to positive externalities) might end up worse off.”). In a thought-provoking
blog post, Professor Luigi Zingales has similarly compared Milton Friedman’s claim
that corporations should focus exclusively on shareholder profits to the First
Theorem of Welfare Economics, drawing out Friedman’s implicit premises and
questioning whether they apply to very large corporations. Luigi Zingales,
Friedman’s Legacy: From Doctrine to Theorem , ProMarket (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://promarket.org/2020/10/13/milton-friedman-legacy-doctrine-theorem/.
45
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20 at 37-38.
46
See William W. Bratton & Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Law and the Myth
of Efficient Market Control, 105 Cornell L. Rev. 675 (2020).
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reformers’ strategy. Reformers following Kaplow and Shavell would focus
their efforts on encouraging redistribution through tax and transfer systems,
instead of attempting to make changes to ordinary legal rules. In principle,
this approach should be the most effective way to achieve a desired outcome
— the tax code is an adequate tool, and altering legal rules would damage
efficiency in a way that reduces the societal wealth available for redistribution.
However, as Professors Lee Fennell and Richard McAdams have
demonstrated, this prescription depends on heroic and contestable
assumptions about political action costs.47 In a variety of contexts,
governments may be more willing to adopt legal rules with redistributive
aspects than to adopt tax and transfer schemes. Even if a package consisting
of an efficient legal rule and a redistributive tax and transfer scheme would
theoretically be preferable to a legal rule calibrated to balance efficiency with
redistribution, it may not be practically achievable given existing political
realities.48 When making a broad recommendation on the choices reformers
should make, it is necessary to consider features of the real world political
process.
Kaplow and Shavell attempt to neutralize these arguments by
suggesting that any attempt to improve distributive outcomes by altering legal
rules will be countered by changes to the tax code that preserve the original
distribution.49 This “invariance” principle bears comparison to the stark
choice hypothesis, as both claim that any effort to reform an internal set of
rules will be balanced out by a change or lack of change in external rules,
leaving the public no better off.50

Fennell & McAdams, Distributive Deficit, supra note 4 at 1052-53 (“law and
economics has neglected a feature of reality that is no less foundational than that of
positive transaction costs: the large and variable costs associated with the political
impediments that must be surmounted to achieve welfare-maximizing distributive
results”).
48
Id. at 1055.
49
Id. (describing this concept as the “invariance hypothesis”); id. at 1072-78
(documenting use of this concept in the law and economics literature). See also
Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient at 675 (suggesting that Congress will alter tax code
to counter any attempt at redistribution through the legal system).
50
Admittedly, stark choice arguments are somewhat more optimistic than
invariance arguments. Those who advance a stark choice claim seem to believe
that positive change is possible; they simply suggest that internal changes will come
at the expense of better external changes. Those who advance an invariance claim
seem to believe that positive change is impossible; they suggest that changes to legal
rules to advance distributive goals will be neutralized by changes to the tax system.
But both groups seem to believe that action along a disfavored path to reform will
have a negative impact on action along a favored path.
47
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But recent research has begun to contest Kaplow and Shavell’s
invariance principle, noting that governments may not be interested in or
capable of countering changes.51 As discussed below, the stark choice
hypothesis is open to similar challenge.
II.

Evaluating the Stark Choice Hypothesis

This Part considers evidence that the stark choice hypothesis is not
true. Part II.A evaluates the premise that some force puts reformers to a
choice between internal and external strategies, and shows that states that
adopt stakeholder-oriented internal corporate governance reforms are often
willing to defend stakeholder interests through external reforms as well. Part
II.B evaluates the premise that reformers will fail to properly evaluate the
effectiveness of internal reforms or the potential for achieving preferable
external reforms. Part II.C considers the political costs of enacting different
reforms in a dynamic context, suggesting that reforms can make other
reforms easier to enact.
A.

Capacity to Adopt Multiple Reforms

The core of the stark choice hypothesis is the idea that some
constraint means that policymakers who adopt internal corporate governance
reforms to help stakeholders will be less likely to adopt external reforms. But
there is little evidence of that effect. Instead, it seems far more likely that
policymakers that are eager to protect particular constituencies adopt both
substantive regulations and stakeholder governance reforms. There are also
many separate policymakers acting simultaneously on independent agendas
to reform internal rules, and they are unlikely to stop at the same point.
1.

Reforms on Multiple Fronts

Reformers appear to be capable of pursuing both external and
internal changes simultaneously, with little indication of trading one set of
changes against the other. This section considers three examples of
simultaneous policy action: the regulatory efforts of states that have adopted
“constituency statutes” that allow corporate directors and officers to consider
the well-being of groups like workers, California’s efforts to improve
outcomes for women in the workforce, and regulators’ efforts to punish and
prevent misconduct.
(a) Constituency Statutes. During the 1980s and 1990s, changes in
the capital markets launched a “hostile takeover era”: an acquirer could
Fennell & McAdams, Distributive Deficit, supra note 4 at 1051-52; Zachary
Liscow, Are Court Orders Sticky? Evidence of Distributional Impacts from School
Finance Litigation, 15 J. Empirical Stud. 4 (2018) (showing that court orders
addressing inequalities in school funding are not undone by legislatures through
regressive taxes).
51
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launch a tender offer to obtain a targeted company’s shares, take over the
company, then generate financial returns at the expense of the targeted
company’s creditors and workers by increasing corporate debt and shedding
jobs.52 For much of this era, the board of directors of a targeted company was
largely powerless to prevent such an acquisition. Delaware’s courts suggested
that a corporate board had an obligation to maximize returns to
shareholders—including by allowing acquirers to purchase shares at a
premium price—and could defend constituencies like workers by preventing
a takeover only if there were “rationally related benefits accruing to the
stockholders.”53 Although later doctrinal developments in Delaware reduced
the practical significance of this position,54 this strict prioritization of the
interests of shareholders over other stakeholders seemed to leave workers
and others defenseless against the depredations of takeover artists.
Under heavy lobbying by managers and the corporate bar, numerous
states responded by enacting constituency statutes. Constituency statutes are
an internal corporate governance reform that permits corporate leaders to
consider the wellbeing of various stakeholders. 55 For example, New York’s
statute provides that
. . . a director shall be entitled to consider, without
limitation, (1) both the long-term and the short-term
interests of the corporation and its shareholders and
(2) the effects that the corporation’s actions may have
in the short-term or in the long term upon any of the
following: . . . (ii) the corporation’s current
employees; (iii) the corporation’s retired employees
and other beneficiaries . . . ; (iv) the corporation’s
customers and creditors; and (v) the ability of the
corporation to provide, as a going concern, goods,
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1 at 105;
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
52

Cardozo L. Rev. 261, 274 (1992) (“In the financial setting of the 1980s,
dramatically higher stock prices could often be achieved by sharply increasing the
debt of the corporation and reducing or eliminating certain operations. But
increasing debt substantially made the enterprise riskier and thus reduced the value
of the corporation’s existing bonds; and restricting operations injured workers and
management, who were thrown out of work.”).
53
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986).
54
Allen, supra note 52 at 276 (noting that Delaware appeared to have
embraced a “social entity conception” of the corporation in Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)). Former
Delaware Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr. provides a nuanced account of these
developments in Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Story of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.,
in Corporate Law Stories 243 (J. Mark Ramseyer, ed. 2009).
55
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1 at 117 (collecting and summarizing
statutes).
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services,
employment
opportunities
and
employment benefits and otherwise to contribute to
the communities in which it does business.56
Under this statute, a director of a New York corporation would be
empowered to prevent a hostile takeover that could result in worker layoffs,
even if the takeover would generate higher financial returns for the company’s
shareholders.57
The states that have adopted such statutes have thus provided an
internal reform to protect constituencies, but they do not seem particularly
unwilling to enact external regulations providing other protections. The 31
states with constituency statutes that explicitly call for or allow consideration
of employees58 do not appear to have reduced minimum wage requirements.
Of those 31, 20 states (or 64.5%) have adopted minimum wage requirements
that exceed the federal requirement.59 Studying the pattern of adoption does
not suggest that a constituency statute makes a state less likely to adopt a
minimum wage statute that further protects employees:

N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717(b).
There is a serious debate about whether directors and officers actually use
this authority to protect stakeholders, or simply use it to extract benefits for
themselves and shareholders. See Bebchuk, Kastiel & Tallarita, supra note 1
(arguing that corporate leaders in states with constituency statutes bargain to obtain
benefits for themselves and for shareholders, not for other stakeholders).
58
Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1 at 117 (Table 1).
59
Minimum wage information collected from the federal Department of
Labor. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, “Consolidated Minimum Wage Table,” (Jan. 1,
2020), available at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/mw-consolidated
56
57
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Table 1.
Employees Identified
in Constituency Statute

Employees Not
Identified in
Constituency Statute

Minimum Wage
Greater Than Federal
Minimum Wage

(20): AZ, CT, FL, HI, (9): AK, AR, CA, CO,
IL, MA, MD, ME, DE, MI, MT, WA,
MN, MO, NE, NJ, WV
NM, NV, NY, OH,
OR, RI, SD, VT

No Minimum Wage
or Lower Than
Federal Minimum
Wage

(11): GA, IA, ID, IN, (10): AL, KS, LA, NC,
KY, MS, ND, PA, TN, NH, OK, SC, TX, UT,
WI, WY
VA

There is also no obvious relationship between a state’s decision to
adopt a constituency statute that protects workers and the generosity of the
state’s unemployment benefits. Of the 31 states that identify employees as a
constituency, 18 states (or 58.1%) replace a higher percentage of wages than
the overall U.S. average.60 Again, the pattern of benefits does not suggest an
obvious relationship between adopting a constituency statute and providing
generous benefits to unemployed workers.
Table 2.
Employees Identified
Employees Not
in Constituency Statute Identified in
Constituency Statute
Higher UI
replacement rate than
U.S. average

(18): HI, ID, IA, KY, (8): CA, CO, KS, MT,
ME, MD, MA, MN, OK, TX, UT, WA
NE, NV, NJ, NM, ND,
OR, PA, SD, VT, WY

Lower UI
replacement rate than
U.S. Average

(13): AZ, CT, FL, GA, (11): AL, AK, AR, DE,
IL, IN, MS, MO, NY, LA, MI, NH, NC, SC,
OH, RI, TN, WI
VA, WV

The replacement rate information is from Q1 2019 and was collected from
the federal Department of Labor. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, “UI Replacement Rates
Report," (Jan. 28, 2021), https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/ui_replacement_rates.asp.
60
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States with constituency statutes imposing an internal rule have also
adopted other regulations to serve constituencies. New York provides a
particularly interesting example. The state does not simply identify
employees as valid stakeholders in its constituency statute. New York also
has a minimum wage of $11.80, well above the federal minimum of $7.25.61
New York’s employment discrimination laws were specifically designed to set
a more worker-friendly standard than federal law.62 And New York makes
the largest shareholders in privately-held corporations personally liable for
wages payable to corporate employees.63 New York did not adopt
stakeholder governance in lieu of more substantive measures; it adopted the
approach as one part of an overall regulatory philosophy that is protective of
employees.
(b) California Women on Boards Statute. Recent years have seen a
reinvigoration of interest in curbing sexual discrimination and harassment.
These problems and the efforts to address them are obviously not a new
development.64 But the reform movement seems to have entered a new phase
as a result of high-profile events including the election of Donald J. Trump
to the presidency despite the public revelation of an audio recording in which
he boasted of engaging in sexual assault in crude terms,65 the revelation of
serious misconduct by Hollywood mogul Harvey Weinstein, 66 and the
Id.
See Governor Cuomo Announces Sweeping New Workplace
Discrimination and Harassment Protections Go Into Effect Today, New York State
61
62

Division of Human Rights (Oct. 11, 2019), https://dhr.ny.gov/new-workplaceprotections-effective.
63
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 630. New York’s solicitousness to employees in
this respect has been described as making it a less attractive place to incorporate.
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law,
55 Stan. L. Rev. 679, 732 (2002).
64
See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working
Women (1979) (documenting sexual harassment and characterizing it as a form of
discrimination). The phrase “Me Too” was coined by activist Tarana Burke in
2007 as part of her efforts to help victims of sexual harassment and assault. Sandra
E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y.
Times (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-toomovement-tarana-burke.html.
65
See, e.g., Alexander Burns, Maggie Haberman & Jonathan Martin,
Donald Trump Apology Caps Day of Outrage Over Lewd Tape, N.Y. Times
(Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/politics/donald-trumpwomen.html.
66
See, e.g., Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault:
Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, The New Yorker (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexualassault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories; Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey,
Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades , N.Y. Times
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinsteinharassment-allegations.html.
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confirmation of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court despite allegations
that he had committed sexual assault.67 Similar revelations also shook
corporate America, with misconduct allegations resulting in the forced
departure of executives at high profile firms. 68
California’s state government responded to these issues with a mix of
internal and external measures. On September 30, 2018, California
Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 826, an internal reform designed
to ensure a minimal level of female representation on the boards of publicly
held corporations chartered or headquartered in California. 69
The proponents of this “Women on Boards” statute routinely
justified the measure by insisting that it would benefit shareholders, perhaps
in the belief that it would be the best justification for a corporate governance
measure or that it would help the statute pass constitutional muster: the bill
itself included legislative findings that women on boards improved corporate
financial performance.70 But the statute also had other goals. The legislative
findings in the statute spoke to the benefits to women as a class as well as
benefits to shareholders as a class.71 Governor Brown’s signing statement also
directly tied the measure to the movement against sexual harassment and
discrimination. The statement suggested that the measure was necessary
because “recent events in Washington, D.C.--and beyond--make it crystal
clear that many are not getting the message,”72 a clear reference to the
confirmation hearings for Brett Kavanaugh. To ensure the message was not

See, e.g., Christine Hauser, The Women Who Have Accused Brett
Kavanaugh, N.Y. Times (Sep. 26, 2018),
67

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-accuserswomen.html
68
For a discussion of the MeToo movement and some of its implications for
corporate governance, see Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment
and Corporate Law, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 1583 (2018).
69
See California Senate Bill 826.
70
Id. § 1(a), (c).
71
Id. § 1(a) (“More women directors serving on boards of directors of
publicly held corporations will . . . improve opportunities for women in the
workplace”). The leading co-author of the bill, state senator Hannah-Beth Jackson
alluded to this mix of motives when she hailed it as “a giant step forward not just
for women but also for our businesses and our economy.” Jorge L. Ortiz,

California’s ‘giant step forward’: Gender-quotas law requires women on corporate
boards, USA Today (Oct. 1, 2018),

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/09/30/california-law-sets-gender-quotascorporate-boardrooms/1482883002/.
72
https://catimes.brightspotcdn.com/89/11/e07e898d40bfa1a532dabef65abe/sb-826-signingmessage.pdf.
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lost, Governor Brown made sure to copy the United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.
On the same day, Governor Brown also signed a package of external
regulations targeting sexual assault, harassment, and discrimination in the
employment context.73 These measures included California Senate Bill 820,
prohibiting the use of non-disclosure agreements in settlements of cases of
sexual assault, sexual harassment, and sex discrimination; Senate Bill 1300,
limiting employers’ ability to use liability waivers; and Assembly Bill 1619,
providing additional time to pursue civil claims for sexual assault.
These internal and external measures can be criticized. Perhaps the
minima established by these measures are too weak, or perhaps a different
set of reforms would accomplish more for women in the workforce. But
there is no indication that robust external measures were traded away for an
ineffective internal measure. California appears to have decided to act on
gender equity issues and attacked on both the internal and external fronts.
(c) Corporate Prosecutions. Government efforts to punish and
prevent corporate misconduct may present a more ambiguous example.
Prosecutors are eager to deter corporate misconduct, and to ensure that
crimes are detected and reported. To achieve these objectives, they often
settle enforcement actions against corporations with agreements that impose
fines and require the companies to make changes to their compliance
function.74 Fines are a classic external strategy—they set a monetary price on
socially harmful conduct, and thus encourage profit-seeking companies to
behave in a socially optimal way. Governance mandates are an internal
strategy—they require firms to adopt structures and reporting processes
intended to improve their decisions.
It is plausible that prosecutors must trade away external measures to
obtain internal measures. Internal mechanisms are costly, both in the sense
that they cost money to implement and in the sense that they may raise the
likelihood of a corporate crime being detected and punished. 75 A case has
Alexei Koseff, California bans secret settlements in sexual harassment
cases, Sacramento Bee (Sep. 30, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics73

government/capitol-alert/article218830265.html.
74
E.g., Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation
through Nonprosecution, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 323 (2017) (pretrial diversion
agreements generally “require firms to pay fines and other monetary penalties,”
and impose mandates regarding compliance); Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail:
How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations (2016) (documenting use of
penalties and structural reforms in agreements).
75
Of course, prosecutors may choose not to punish a corporation if its
compliance function is well-designed and detects and reports employee
misconduct. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of
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some fixed expected value, and a corporation will not agree to pay more than
that value to settle it, whether in the form of increased compliance costs or in
the form of a fine. If prosecutors demand increased compliance spending, it
will decrease the amount of the fine that they can demand.
But this effect is likely to be limited. Prosecutors likely settle cases
for far less than their expected value. Prosecutors can plausibly threaten to
end businesses with crippling fines or by revoking licenses; they stay their
hand out of concern about effects on innocent stakeholders, such as
employees and surrounding communities,76 and because of an internalized
sense of appropriate punishments.77 As a result, the expected value of the
case may not be a binding constraint on the prosecutor’s decision: the
prosecutor was never going to demand the full value of the case as an external
fine. If a prosecutor attaches some new internal condition to a deal, it may
not come at the expense of a larger fine.
Again, there is room to debate the propriety of internal terms in the
settlement of enforcement actions against corporations. 78 But the propriety
Business Organizations § 9-28.300, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.300 (“adequacy and
effectiveness of the corporation’s compliance program at the time of the offense, as
well as at the time of a charging decision” and “the corporation’s timely and
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing” are factors to be considered when exercising
prosecutorial discretion).
76
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment 12 (2020)
(“[H]igh penalties can cause externalities, as creditors, employees, and others
closely connected to the corporation are injured.”); Jesse Eisinger, The
Chickenshit Club: Why the Justice Department Fails to Prosecute Executives 94
(2017) (“Prosecutors and regulators were crippled by the idea that the government
could not criminally sanction some companies—particularly large banks—for fear
that they would collapse, causing serious problems for financial markets or the
economy.”); Garrett, supra note 74 at 59 (agreeing with Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales’s observation that the criminal “conviction of an organization can affect
innocent workers and others associated with the organization, and can even have
an impact on the national economy”). In response to this problem, Professor
Coffee has proposed that corporate fines should be imposed in the form of equity,
thus creating a meaningful financial incentive without affecting the company’s
operations or non-shareholder stakeholders. Coffee, supra at 12.
77
See Dorothy S. Lund & Natasha Sarin, Corporate Crime and Punishment:
An Empirical Study, 100 Tex. L. Rev 285 (2021) (showing that recidivist
companies pay smaller fines as a percentage of market capitalization and revenue,
and suggesting that prosecutors may have internalized some upper bound on fines
that they apply regardless of the size of the corporate defendant).
78
See, e.g., Arlen & Kahan, supra note 74 at 323-24 (urging that regulators
generally should not impose corporate governance mandates unless there is an
indication of an agency problem). But there are reasons to think that such
conditions cause corporations to make real efforts to report misconduct and
provide evidence, and that corporations may systematically underinvest in
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and effectiveness of internal steps is separate from the question of whether
they take away from external steps. It is not clear that they do, even in the
unique context of prosecutions.
2.

Multiple Reformers Pursuing Internal Reforms

The concept of limited capacity also ignores the presence of multiple
independent policymakers with the capacity to execute separate policy
agendas. An external reform, such as a law against employment
discrimination, can be plausibly pursued only by a small set of public actors
that face serious constraints on action. By contrast, an internal reform can be
pursued by a much broader set of actors, including in the private sector. The
diversity of actors who can impose internal reforms means that internal
reforms can proceed even where external regulators are satisfied or have
exhausted their political capital.
An external reform at the federal level will generally require
congressional action. Congress must either enact a statute addressing a
problem, or must have previously enacted a statute that administrative
agencies can use to address that problem. The federal legislative process is
characterized by inertia — it takes enormous effort to set it in motion — and it
requires an unusually broad national coalition to achieve success. It also has
a number of veto gates and procedural idiosyncrasies that can affect the
content79 or success of legislation.80 And even if a statute is enacted, it must
compliance without them. See Aruna Viswanatha & Dave Michaels, Flaws Emerge
in Justice Department Strategy for Prosecuting Wall Street , Wall St. J. (July 5,
2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/flaws-emerge-in-justice-department-strategy-forprosecuting-wall-street-11625506658 (recounting anecdotes suggesting that
corporations under such mandates vigorously investigate employees suspected of
misconduct and turn over evidence to prosecutors); John Armour, Jeffrey Gordon
& Geeyoung Min, Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (2020)
(corporate leaders sensitive to stock prices may systematically underinvest in
compliance to avoid signaling to market that the company is at a high risk of
violating the law).
79
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was
intended to address the risk of failure of important financial institutions. Professor
David Skeel has suggested that the Act did not use a bankruptcy framework for
dealing with failed banks because Senator Dodd and Representative Frank
controlled committees focused on financial issues, and a statute using a bankruptcy
framework would fall under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committees. Using a
bankruptcy framework would require Dodd and Frank to surrender control over
the legislation. David Skeel, The New Financial Deal 53-54 (2011).
80
Current Senate rules generally require a sixty vote supermajority to defeat
a filibuster and pass legislation. However, certain legislation on budget matters can
be passed by the Senate with a bare majority through the reconciliation process. In
2021, the Senate Parliamentarian ruled that an increase in the minimum wage did
not qualify for the reconciliation process; the ruling was widely-regarded as
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be implemented by regulators and prosecutors in the executive, and survive
review from often hostile federal judges. The necessary consensus is
frequently lacking at the federal level. 81
Absent federal leadership, external reform at the state level is difficult.
State governments are often prevented from regulating on areas of federal
interest by preemption, the dormant commerce clause, and other doctrines. 82
They are also constrained by competitive dynamics. States and local
governments vigorously compete to attract investments by large employers. 83
As a result, a single state cannot unilaterally adopt external regulations without
consequence.
These forces are also present when federal or state regulators seek to
reform internal rules, though sometimes to a lesser degree. It is difficult to
pass federal legislation adopting new rules addressed to internal issues, just as
it is difficult to pass federal legislation adopting new external rules. But there
are already important federal statutes on the books that permit administrative
agencies to take meaningful action on various governance issues. For
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission is already empowered to
require or regulate disclosures by public companies, and can use that power
to address disclosures on employee, environmental, social, and governance
dooming the prospects for an immediate increase in the federal minimum wage.
See Kristina Peterson, Meet the Senate Parliamentarian, Referee in MinimumWage Debate, Wall St. J. (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-thesenate-parliamentarian-key-figure-in-minimum-wage-debate-11614168008.
81
For a brief summary of these issues and the failure of regulation to play its
required role in constraining corporations, See Aneil Kovvali & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,

The Win-Win That Wasn’t: Managing to the Stock Market’s Negative Effects on
American Workers and Other Corporate Stakeholders, 2022 U.Chi. Bus. L. Rev.
--- (forthocoming).
82
For example, during the Trump Administration, the Department of
Justice investigated the state of California for attempting to reach agreements with
automakers on tighter fuel economy standards. The subsequent Biden
Administration dropped the inquiry. See Coral Davenport, Justice Department

Drops Antitrust Probe Against Automakers That Sided With California on
Emissions, N.Y. Times (Feb. 7, 2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/climate/trump-california-automakersantitrust.html.
83
See, e.g., Strine, Corporate Power, supra note 1 at 183-85 (describing how
Delaware communities engaged in a “bidding war” on taxes to retain the
operations of DuPont and Dow). This dynamic can sometimes support external
regulation. See Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, The Political Economy of
Corporate Exit, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 1293, 1295 (2018) (“By making clear that they
are unwilling to do business in places that deny equal treatment to LGBT people,
corporations have been instrumental in defeating state laws that would restrict
transgender bathroom access or permit business owners to refuse services to gay,
lesbian, or transgender people.”).
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issues. The Department of Labor is already empowered to regulate
important institutional investors that deploy worker funds, and can use that
power to address the way that those institutional investors use their voting
power within corporations.84
State governments also arguably face
competition in their selection of internal rules. If a Delaware corporation
prefers Minnesota corporate law, it can reincorporate in Minnesota. But
Delaware’s dominance in corporate law raises a real question as to whether
that competition is meaningful,85 and whether it constrains states other than
Delaware.86
But more importantly, internal reform can proceed without the
involvement of the federal and state actors required for external reforms.
Quasi-governmental entities like the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) can adopt rules and stock exchanges like the NYSE and NASDAQ
can adopt listing requirements that speak to governance issues. 87 Fully private
entities like institutional investors can also insist on reforms, using their power
as shareholders to vote and engage with management on issues of
importance. Given the increasingly large stakes held by institutional investors
like index funds, they have substantial power to force corporations to follow
their preferences: the big three index fund providers, Blackrock, Inc., State
Street Global Advisors, and Vanguard Group collectively cast about 25% of

See infra Part III.C.
There is an extensive literature on whether states compete with each other
in adopting internal corporate governance rules, and whether that competition is a
healthy race to the top or an unhealthy race to the bottom. See, e.g., Marcel
Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate
Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1573, 1576 (2005) (federal intervention threatens
Delaware’s hold only during times of crisis); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over
Corporate Charters, 112 Yale L.J. 553 (2002) (suggesting that Delaware faces
relatively little competition for charters); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition,
117 Harv. L. Rev. 588 (2002) (suggesting that Delaware does not face competition
from other states, but does face the risk of intervention by the federal government);
Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993) (suggesting that
Delaware has succeeded in a competition to charter corporations, leading to a
healthy result); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974) (suggesting that Delaware was leading a
race to the bottom). The existence of meaningful competition is at best uncertain.
86
Former Delaware Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr. has suggested that states
other than Delaware were free to adopt antitakeover laws like constituency statutes
because only managers and employees had political potency in those states. By
contrast, Delaware had to maintain a reputation for fairly protecting shareholder
interests. See Strine, Story of Blasius, supra note 54 at 252.
87
For a broad discussion of the increasingly governmental role of “SelfRegulatory Organizations,” see William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson,
Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2013).
84
85
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the shareholder votes in each of the S&P 500 companies. 88 The power of
these institutional investors has also empowered the institutions that advise
them. Two firms, ISS and Glass Lewis, issue particularly influential advice
on how shareholders should cast their proxy votes. Their pronouncements
have been so difficult for corporations to resist that one commentator has
likened their rulings to a “New Civil Code” regulating corporate affairs.89
Each of these groups has different powers, and some are vulnerable
to action by federal or state authorities. For example, if NASDAQ wishes to
impose a new listing requirement it must obtain the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s approval. And institutional investors may worry that if they
are too aggressive in using their power, regulators will take steps to curb
them.90
But each of these groups also has its own agenda, process, and
constituency. If Blackrock wants to take action on some issue, it does not
need to mobilize the nationwide coalition required to make the House,
Senate, and President act in concert. It simply needs to be mindful of the
preferences of its customers and the red lines of its regulators. And
BlackRock’s narrow purview and focused constituency can make it want to
act in circumstances where more generalized institutions like Congress would
simply remain inert.91 As a result, a private actor like Blackrock can take steps
that are not approved, or even are actively condemned, by the public actors
who would have to approve an external regulation. And a private actor like
Blackrock can continue to press forward on an issue even when public actors
have exhausted their political capital.
Three simple examples show how internal mechanisms of reform can
proceed even where public regulators have refused or lost interest.
(a) Women on Boards. As discussed above,92 California has sought
to require public companies chartered or headquartered in the state to have
some minimum level of female representation on their boards of directors.
See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of
Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2029,
88

2033 (2019).
89
Neil Whoriskey, The New Civil Code: ISS and Glass Lewis as
Lawmakers, The CLS Blue Sky Blog (July 28, 2020),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/07/28/cleary-gottlieb-discusses-the-newcivil-code-of-iss-and-glass-lewis/.
90
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 88 at 2066-71. See infra Part III.C.
91
Cf. Dhammika Dharmapala, The Congressional budget process, aggregate
spending, and statutory budget rules, 90 J. of Pub. Econ. 119 (2005) (small interest
groups could lobby focused committees in Congress more effectively than the
more general Budget Committee, due to potential for free riding).
92
See supra notes 64 to 73 and accompanying text.
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But this requirement may be vulnerable to challenge on constitutional
grounds, and it is limited in its geographic scope. 93
Other actors have sought to step in. The NASDAQ stock exchange
has sought to impose a similar gender diversity requirement for the boards of
corporations listed on the exchange.94 And major index fund provider State
Street Global Advisors made a high profile push to require large corporations
to include women on their boards.95 Because of the enormous size of the
portfolio State Street manages, the campaign was highly influential.
(b) Classified or Staggered Boards. The directors of a corporation
must face regular elections in which the shareholders cast votes. The
directors can be divided into up to three “classes,” with only one class facing
an election in a given year.96 If the board is not classified, all of the directors
have one year terms and all can be voted out in a year. If the board is
classified into three groups, all of the directors have three year terms and only
one third of the directors can be voted out in a given year. As a result, a
would-be acquirer can only capture a majority of a classified board by
prevailing in two annual shareholder elections. Acquirers can be deterred
further by a “poison pill” defense that prevents them from purchasing more
than a fraction of the available shares on the market. This prevents a wouldbe acquirer from simply purchasing a majority of the shares then voting those
shares in two consecutive elections—to get control of the board, the acquirer
must persuade its fellow shareholders to agree in two consecutive elections.
In Air Products v. Airgas, 97 the Delaware Court of Chancery approved
this potent combination of defenses. In effect, the state of Delaware refused
to curb the use of these tactics. But private actors did not simply accept this
outcome. Professor Lucian Bebchuk and his Harvard Law School
Shareholder Rights Project coordinated and assisted a vigorous campaign to
declassify corporate boards. The tactics and objective of the effort are hotly

The Ninth Circuit recently authorized a shareholder to proceed with a
14th Amendment challenge to the statute based on his allegation that the statute
unconstitutionally encouraged him to discriminate on the basis of sex. Meland v.
Weber, 2 F.4th 838 (9th Cir. 2021).
93

Nasdaq to Advance Diversity through New Proposed Listing
Requirements, Nasdaq (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.nasdaq.com/press94

release/nasdaq-to-advance-diversity-through-new-proposed-listing-requirements2020-12-01.
95
Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s):
Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1243 (2020).
96
8 Del. C. § 141(d).
97
16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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disputed.98 But the effectiveness of the effort is not open to serious question:
“classified boards are becoming rare and are on their way toward endangeredspecies status.”99
(c) Dual Class Shares. A corporation can slice voting and cash-flow
rights in different ways. If there is a single class of shares, a person who owns
1% of the shares will receive 1% of corporate dividends and can cast 1% of
the votes each year. But a corporation could use multiple classes of shares
to divide cash flows and power differently. An owner of high-powered shares
may be entitled to cast 10% of the votes despite being entitled to only 1% of
the dividends. As a result, a founder can use high-powered shares to retain
control of the company and pursue a singular vision while raising cash by
selling low-powered shares to others.
In 1988, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted rule 19c4, sharply discouraging companies from restricting voting rights. The rule
was struck down as exceeding the Commission’s statutory authority in 1990,
and the SEC made no attempt to revive it.100 But again, private actors did not
sit still. Institutional investors urged the stock exchanges to prohibit listings
of dual classes of shares.101 And the S&P Dow Jones Indices prevented
For particularly vigorous criticisms of the effort, and its effect on corporate
value, see K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Board Declassification
Activism: The Financial Value of the Shareholder Rights Project (June 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2962162 (presenting results
that “are inconsistent with the entrenchment view of classified boards and support
the commitment view that, at least at some firms, classified boards serve a positive
governance function by helping to bond directors and shareholders to long-term
value creation”); Daniel M. Gallagher & Joseph A. Grundfest, Did Harvard
98

Violate Federal Securities Law? The Campaign Against Classified Boards of
Directors (Rock Center for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No.199, 2014)

(suggesting that the Harvard Shareholder Rights Project violated federal law by
making misleading claims in support of shareholder resolutions seeking
elimination of staggered boards); Martin Lipton & Theodore Mirvis, Harvard’s
Shareholder Rights Project is Wrong, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corporate Governance
(Mar. 23, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/23/harvardsshareholder-rights-project-is-wrong/ (“There is no persuasive evidence that
declassifying corporate boards enhance stockholder value over the long-term, and
it is our experience that the absence of a staggered board makes it significantly
harder for a public company to fend off an inadequate, opportunistic takeover bid,
and is harmful to companies that focus on long-term value creation.”).
99
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic
Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 Colum.
L. Rev. 449, 497 (2014).
100
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
101
Alexandra Scaggs, Investor Group to Exchanges: Stop Dual-Class Listings,
Wall St. J. (Oct. 11, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443749204578050431073959840
.
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companies with multiple classes of shares from joining the S&P 500 index. 102
This move was highly consequential for companies with multiple classes of
shares because the increasingly-large investors who seek to passively follow
the S&P 500 index would not have to buy shares of those companies. 103 Yet
again, private actors were able to press an agenda even where public
authorities had been unable to do so.
*

*

*

These examples are not offered to suggest that private actors will
always make the right decisions. Indeed, there are serious reasons for
concern that these private actors often share a single and potentially
wrongheaded philosophy on corporate governance.104 The point is that
internal reform can proceed on a different track from external reform, and
can be pressed by a different set of actors. In order for the stark choice
hypothesis to be true, this divergent set of actors must be satisfied or
exhausted at the same point. Given their divergent agendas, processes, and
constituencies, there is little reason to believe that is the case.
B.

Reformer Expectations

The stark choice hypothesis also depends upon the premise that
advocates for stakeholder interests misapprehend some critical facts. If
reformers correctly evaluate the relative efficacy of internal and external
reforms and if they correctly evaluate the political feasibility of potential
reforms, then they will not trade away a useful external reform for a useless
internal reform.
1.

Reformer Pessimism About Internal Reforms

Reformers who are interested in restructuring the American economy
plainly have not been mollified by the emergence of stakeholder governance.
Until recently, the Business Roundtable took the position that the purpose of
the corporation was to generate financial returns to shareholders. As
prominent institutional investors like BlackRock began to urge a
reorientation of corporate America, the Business Roundtable revised its

Chris Dieterich, Maureen Farrell & Sarah Krouse, Stock Indexes Push
Back Against Dual-Class Listings, Wall St. J. (Aug. 2, 2017),
102

https://www.wsj.com/articles/stock-indexes-push-back-against-dual-class-listings1501612170.

Id.
See Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance
Machine, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 2563 (2021) (arguing that many important players
103
104

have accepted and act on a “shareholder primacy” agenda).
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position, issuing a statement on the purpose of the corporation declaring that
corporations shared a fundamental commitment to all of their stakeholders. 105
After the Business Roundtable published its statement on the
purpose of the corporation, conservative commentators reacted by making
the easy prediction that political progressives would not be satisfied. 106
Progressives promptly proved them right. Senator Elizabeth Warren issued
public letters to signatories of the Business Roundtable statement demanding
that they endorse her Accountable Capitalism Act and outline concrete steps
they were taking on behalf of stakeholders.107 Senator Bernie Sanders’s
presidential campaign website similarly took note of the Business
Roundtable’s new position on the purpose of the corporation but responded,
“Empty words are not enough,” and promised an aggressive regulatory
program.108
The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board summarized this reaction in
memorable, if exaggerated, terms:
The lesson for the CEOs is that the new
progressives won’t be satisfied until they effectively
own you. The Roundtable statement succeeded
mainly in convincing the left that it has business on
the run. Ms. Warren is already measuring the length
of the rope to hang them. 109
Given this type of commentary, it is far from obvious that reformers
systematically overestimate the impact of internal reforms, and drop demands
for external reforms in response.

See Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of
a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’ (Aug. 19,
105

2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-thepurpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
106
See, e.g., Editorial Board, “The ‘Stakeholder’ CEOs,” WALL ST. J. (Aug.
19, 2019), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-stakeholder-ceos11566248641 (“Yet these CEOs are fooling themselves if they think this new
rhetoric will buy off Ms. Warren and the socialist left.”).
107
See Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren (Oct. 3, 2019), available at
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-1003%20Letters%20to%20CEOs.pdf.
108
Sanders Campaign, “Corporate Accountability and Democracy,” (last
accessed Apr. 4, 2020) available at https://bit.ly/2yT7AHW.
109
Senator Warren Measures the Rope, Wall St. J. (Sep. 30, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/senator-warren-measures-the-rope-11601507790. As
discussed below, this reaction alludes to the potential for dynamic interactions
between reforms.
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Of course, even if committed reformers are not convinced, relatively
disengaged members of the public might be. Political leaders that oppose
external reform might cite internal changes as proof that external reform is
not required, and voters who lack information may simply believe them.110
Political leaders who are hostile to regulatory reform may be happy to have
the cover from businesses, even if the internal changes have no real effect.
But it is an enormous leap from this possibility to the idea that pivotal
policymakers like the median Senator or Representative would approve an
external reform but for an internal reform.
Internal rhetoric could also conceivably allow corporate leaders to
change the subject. For example, conservative commentator Vivek
Ramaswamy has asserted that Big Tech distracted liberal reformers from a
conversation about monopoly power by agreeing to censor content, that Big
Pharma distracted from a conversation about drug pricing by discussing
subjects like racism and environmentalism, and that Coca-Cola distracted
from a conversation about diabetes and obesity by discussing voting laws and
racism.111 These concerns are difficult to credit. Companies often restrict
their commentary to areas of operational concern.112 The strategy also seems
unlikely to succeed: for example, effective censorship by a media company
would only call additional attention to its monopoly power. And it seems to
reflect a willful misreading of the political environment. Liberals appear to
remain committed to issues including attacking monopoly power and
addressing drug pricing, despite corporate rhetoric on unrelated issues. 113
More fundamentally, there would be little reason for optimism about
external reforms in general if these strategies are effective. If corporations
Reich, supra note 32 at 40-50.
Varadarajan, supra note 1.
112
See, e.g., David Gelles, ‘Our Menu Is Very Darwinian.’ Leading
McDonald’s in 2021, N.Y. Times (July 2, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/business/chris-kempczinski-mcdonaldscorner-office.html (McDonalds CEO justifying refusal to speak out on voting rights
issues because it was not a core issue for the company).
113
For example, Democratic President Joe Biden appointed several serious
critics of corporate power to important posts in his administration, including Lina
Khan and Tim Wu, and issued an executive order urging efforts to improve
competition in the American economy. E.g., Ryan Tracy, Meet Tim Wu, the
Man Behind Biden’s Push to Promote Business Competition, Wall St. J. (July 9,
2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-man-behind-bidens-push-to-promotebusiness-competition-11625851555. And liberal Senator Bernie Sanders has
continued to urge changes to Medicare that would allow the government to
negotiate drug prices down. E.g., Kristina Peterson & Stephanie Armour, Sanders,
Progressives Face Split With Centrists Over Plan to Cut Drug Prices in Medicare ,
Wall St. J. (July 7, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-split-overmeasures-to-cut-drug-prices-11625662801.
110
111
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and their political allies can readily dupe the public, it is hard to imagine
meaningful external reforms ever being enacted: a business that is focused
exclusively on maximizing financial returns to shareholders will use precisely
the same tactic to defeat external reforms. In other words, to the extent it
exists, this phenomenon is not caused by stakeholder governance; it would
be a reason for pessimism about external reforms even in a world of pure
shareholder primacy.
2.

Reformer Realism About External Processes

There is also no evidence that reformers systematically
misunderstand the political constraints that they operate under. It is far from
obvious that reformers like Senator Warren mistakenly believe that external
reforms are not possible and settle for internal corporate reforms as a result.
Instead, it is far more common to see would-be reformers criticized for being
overly optimistic about the potential for new external rules.
And indeed, much of the demand for internal corporate change has
been prompted by reasonable frustration at the processes and prospects for
external regulation. As Professor Tim Wu has put it, “one reason there is so
much mounting pressure for corporations to take action today is that
government has failed to act in many areas that people care about, often by
overwhelming margins.”114 This concern about governmental failure is wellfounded. Scholars in diverse fields like labor law and environmental law have
complained about the “ossification” of regulatory schemes, as the
government has failed to enact new measures in response to changing
circumstances.115
Vaccinations for COVID-19 present a salient example. Despite the
urgent threat to public health from unvaccinated individuals — and the fact
that a substantial majority of American adults have chosen to get vaccinated
— government officials have made only fitful progress in requiring the shots.
As of this writing, a major part of the federal government’s plan to increase
vaccination rates is to encourage business leaders to impose mandates on

114
115

Wu, supra note 13.
See Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102

Colum. L. Rev. 1527, 1530 (2002) (“The basic statutory language, and many of the
intermediate level principles and procedures through which the essentials of selforganization and collective bargaining are put into practice, have been nearly
frozen, or ossified, for over fifty years.”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private
Environmental Governance, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 129, 131 (2013) (observing that
“no major federal environmental statute has been enacted since the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990,” and that the “period of statutory inaction” exceeded “the
period of statutory growth”).
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their employees instead of imposing a mandate directly.116 An attempt to
require employers to impose mandates on employees through external
regulation was defeated in litigation.117 And the federal government and
business are at least moving in the same direction. Cruise lines and Florida
Governor Ron DeSantis are locked in litigation over whether the cruise lines
can require passengers to be vaccinated. DeSantis has persisted in his
position that unvaccinated individuals should be able to enter confined cruise
ships even though an overwhelming majority of Floridians disagree.118
Businesses appear to be willing to give the public what it wants, even though
political actors are paralyzed or actively unhelpful.
This dynamic — a blocked path to external reform, leading to demand
for progress along a relatively open path to internal reform — can extend to
the legislative arena. Managers have historically been a powerful interest
group, and they often have good reasons to support or tolerate internal
governance changes while resisting external regulation. 119 Both internal and
external rules are likely to reduce corporate profits. But an internal rule will
shift the corporation’s balance of power away from the stock market, so that

In one telling exchange, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki suggested
that a vaccine mandate was “not the role of the federal government; that is the role
that institutions, private-sector entities, and others may take.” Press Briefing by
Press Secretary Jen Psaki, White House (July 23, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/07/23/pressbriefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-july-23-2021/.
117
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) issued an
Emergency Temporary Standard requiring that employees either be vaccinated or
wear masks and be tested regularly. This requirement was stayed by the Fifth
Circuit. The Sixth Circuit dissolved the stay. See In re: MCP No. 165, OSHA
Interim Final Rule: COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary
Standard 86 Fed. Reg. 61402, No. 21-7000 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2021) (summarizing
litigation and dissolving Fifth Circuit stay). But the Supreme Court ultimately
stayed the rule, finding in an unsigned decision that parties challenging the rule
were likely to prevail. Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 142 S.
Ct. 661 (2022) (per curiam).
118
See Anthony Man, Poll shows vast majority of Floridians disagree on
116

DeSantis policy, think it’s OK to require COVID-19 vaccinations for cruise
passengers, South Florida Sun-Sentinel (Jun. 16, 2021), https://www.sun-

sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-ne-florida-poll-cruise-ship-theme-park-school-vaccinerequirements-20210616-qaiozhbvurhrplkwh5fuvyeoqa-story.html.
119
See Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of
American Corporate Finance 43 (1994) (suggesting that managers successfully
prevented the emergence of strong American financial institutions that could
pressure managers by voting stock, and enlarged their power through constituency
statutes that weakened shareholder voice); cf. Roe & Shapira, supra note 1 at 25
(describing coalitions between groups like employees and executives in favor of
reforms that would stymie stock-market short-termism).
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more of the pain can be offloaded onto shareholders instead of being borne
by managers themselves.
There also appears to be more bipartisan support for internal reform
than for external rules. For example, conservatives have generally been
opposed to external rules intended to address economic inequality or
improve working conditions. But prominent conservatives have expressed
interest in solutions that are internal in nature, such as codetermination.120
This interest can be understood as reflecting conservatives’ general
preference for private ordering, in which parties are empowered to “make
tradeoffs tailored to their circumstances and preferences, rendering much
bureaucratic oversight superfluous.”121 A similar bipartisan coalition
supported the rise of benefit corporation legislation in a majority of states: the
legislation allowed private parties to create corporations with purposes other
than shareholder value maximization, and this facilitation of private ordering
proved congenial to members of both parties.122 Given the need for a sizeable
coalition to overcome the hurdles to federal legislation, conservative
opposition to external reform and openness to internal reform may make the
difference between impossibility and possibility.
C.

Dynamic Interactions Between Reforms

The stark choice hypothesis also neglects the potential for dynamic
interaction between reforms. A more stakeholder-focused model for
corporate decision-making can make external reforms more likely by
reducing corporate opposition to external reform and causing some
corporations to actively support external reform. Corporate attention to an
issue can improve electoral dynamics by convincing voters of the need for
regulation. And stakeholder-focused models of corporate decision-making
can make external regulations more valuable while reducing their costs,
increasing the likelihood of their adoption.
1.

Corporate Power Over the Political Process

Corporations wield extraordinary influence over the political
process.123 If their leaders are instructed to consider only shareholder
See American Compass, Conservatives Should Ensure Workers a Seat at
the Table (Sep. 6, 2020), https://americancompass.org/essays/conservatives-should120

ensure-workers-a-seat-at-the-table/ (statement expressing interest in solutions like
codetermination signed by conservatives including Senator Marco Rubio).
121

Id.

Lund & Pollman, supra note 101 at 38.
Critics of corporate political spending generally start from this premise.
But it is also a basic premise of most supporters of corporate political spending. If
corporate political spending did not influence political outcomes in a way that
expanded corporate profits, it would be an inefficient waste and tolerating it would
122
123
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interests, that influence will generally only be deployed to defeat external
reforms. For precisely that reason, numerous commentators have urged that
politically powerful corporations must be internally reformed so that they
deploy their political power in a manner consistent with social welfare. 124
Even softer internal changes can have an impact on the way that
corporations engage with the political process. The signatories to the
Business Roundtable’s statement would find it somewhat more awkward to
openly advocate for a shareholder-friendly program of deregulation. By
raising expectations that they will behave morally, the corporations made it
more costly for them to do otherwise.125 ExxonMobil similarly found itself
challenged as a result of a seemingly soft commitment to the Paris
Agreement, a global accord focused on reducing carbon emissions. When
the company was unable to explain how its lobbying efforts aligned with that
commitment, the failure helped lead major institutional investors to vote to

be a violation of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties. Cf. Jonathan Macey,
Using ‘Disclosure’ to Silence Corporate America, Wall St. J. (Oct. 21, 2013)
(“Boards of directors’ fiduciary duties to maximize shareholder value often require
that companies engage with the politicians who control the competitive and
regulatory environment in which they operate.”).
Professors Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., and their coauthors
chart a potential third course when they suggest that corporations should have to
provide additional disclosure of their political spending because much corporate
political spending is unlikely to advance shareholders’ interests. E.g., Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson, James David Nelson & Roberto Tallarita, The
Untenable Case for Keeping Investors in the Dark, 10 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 1
(2020); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate
Political Spending, 101 Geo. L. J. 923 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J.
Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 83
(2010). But in a sign of their influence over the political process, corporate
lobbyists have repeatedly defeated such disclosure requirements in Congress.
Bebchuk, et al., Untenable Case, supra at 5 & n.15.
124
See, e.g., Jens Damann & Horst Eidenmueller, Taming the Corporate
Leviathan: Codetermination and the Democratic State, Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.
Working
Paper
No.
536/2020
(Aug.
27,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3680769; Wu, supra note 13;
Nikolas Bowie, Corporate Personhood v. Corporate Statehood, 132 Harv. L. Rev.
2009 (2019); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?:
The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United,
100 Cornell L. Rev. 335 (2015); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or
Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 334, 365
(2008).
125
E.g. Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, The Political Economy of
Corporate Exit, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 1293, 1307-09 (2018) (corporations are
increasingly expected to take political stances, and penalized by stakeholders when
they fail to do so).
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replace Exxon directors.126 As BlackRock explained, the “misalignment”
between Exxon’s public positions and lobbying activities created a
reputational risk for the company.127 Simply by publicly committing itself to
stakeholder-friendly internal corporate governance, the firm changed its
capacity to affect external regulation through lobbying.
Lobbying efforts are only one tool that corporations have for securing
legal change. Apart from quietly influencing and supporting political friends,
corporations can pick public fights with political adversaries. Internal
corporate decisions to protest offensive laws by exiting hostile jurisdictions
can affect the external regulatory process. For example, when North Carolina
adopted new legislation targeting LGBTQ individuals, corporations pared
back investment and spending in the state, costing it approximately $200
million in lost business.128 Republican Governor Pat McCrory’s popularity
plummeted, and he lost the next election despite a favorable national political
environment.129 Importantly, this mechanism does not require voters to
actually agree with or be persuaded by corporate values. It simply requires
that voters prioritize economic issues over cultural issues, and that businesses
have the power and inclination to force them to make that choice.
More aggressive measures are also possible. As Professor Elizabeth
Pollman has noted, corporations can also pick fights with regulators,
including by openly flouting their regulations.130
Such “Corporate
Disobedience” can change facts on the ground in a way that supports
regulatory changes by affecting consumer tastes; can expose limits on
regulators’ power through litigation that clarifies legal restrictions; and can
force regulators to set new priorities by testing how much they are really
willing to spend to defend and enforce an existing legal regime. Through
such tactics, companies like Uber have reshaped the regulation of entire
industries. While intuitions about the normative implications of such actions
can vary from case to case, it is clear that corporations can affect external
regulatory process if internal mechanisms cause them to do so.

See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, EESG Activism After
ExxonMobil, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (July 23, 2021),
126

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/23/eesg-activism-after-exxonmobil/
(describing positions taken by BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street). The effort
to replace ExxonMobil directors is described further in Part III.B.1.
127
Katz & McIntosh, supra note 126.
128
Kuo & Means, supra note 125 at 1324-25.
129
Id. at 1325; German Lopez, NC’s Republican governor just conceded his
election. He can probably blame his own anti-LGBTQ law, Vox (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/12/5/13776408/mccrory-coopergovernor-north-carolina-election-lgbtq.
130
Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 Duke L.J. 709 (2019).
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There are at least four counterarguments to the claim that dynamic
interactions mean that internal reforms make external reforms more likely.
First, internal corporate governance changes may cause leading companies to
clean up their act just enough to avoid the striking exemplary abuses that can
motivate reform.131 Without shocking headlines describing corporate greed
trumping other human values, there may not be enough impetus to overcome
legislative inertia and prompt legislation. But this argument depends on the
idea that the internal rule will actually improve corporate behavior; it also
depends on a belief that the political process will not permit action absent
some shocking motivation. On those assumptions, it is hard to accept that
reformers should avoid internal changes because better external changes are
possible. Stakeholder governance could also raise expectations for corporate
behavior, and lead to greater outrage when companies fall short of the
public’s expectations.132
Second, internal changes might increase the clout of corporations, by
allowing them to claim that they are acting on behalf of stakeholders and to
cozy up to political leaders.133 That clout can then be deployed to defeat
external reforms. But these moves are already available to corporations.
Corporate leaders regularly lobby against external regulations by saying that
they will destroy jobs, positioning themselves as acting on behalf of employees
or potential employees instead of shareholders.134 Financial institutions
Cf. Reich, supra note 32 at 18-19 (noting the role that exposures of
particular corporate abuses have played in encouraging external reforms).
132
Hajin Kim, Self-Fulfilling Stakeholder Expectations, Working Paper
(2021).
133
See Gatti & Ondersma, Stakeholder Approach Chimera, supra note 1 at
64-67. Similar mechanisms have been described in India. See Afra Afsharipour,
Lessons from India’s Struggles with Corporate Purpose, CLS Blue Sky Blog (Feb.
4, 2021), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2021/02/04/lessons-from-indiasstruggles-with-corporate-purpose/.
China may present a more complex example. Wealthy individuals and
important businesses appear to be engaging in social spending in an effort to
reduce government pressure. See, e.g., Li Yuan, What China Expects From
Businesses: Total Surrender, N.Y. Times (July 19, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/technology/what-china-expects-frombusinesses-total-surrender.html. But it is not clear how this maps onto an internal
versus external divide. The relevant individuals and businesses appear to be
demonstrating loyalty to the government, and alignment with its policies. Though
internal decisions are being taken in an effort to avoid the application of external
force, it is not clear that the decisions have the effect of loosening external
requirements.
134
See, e.g., U.S. Chamber Opposes Government Price Controls That Will
Destroy Jobs and Threaten Access, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Apr. 22, 2021),
https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-opposes-government-pricecontrols-will-destroy-jobs-and-threaten-access (asserting that the Lower Drug Costs
Now Act of 2019 would “Destroy Jobs”).
131
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similarly urge that external regulations will reduce access to credit, positioning
themselves as acting on behalf of would-be borrowers instead of
shareholders.135 Internal reforms would only increase the effectiveness of
these lobbying tactics if corporations actually began to advocate on behalf of
their stakeholders, or if political actors had been too credulous about the
impact of internal changes. The former possibility would not be a strong
argument against internal reform, and the latter possibility seems inconsistent
with recent experience.136
Third, competitive dynamics can play an important role. Internal
corporate rules are often made by entities with limited authority. For
example, state governments are constrained by the internal affairs doctrine,
which limits their ability to regulate the corporate governance machinery of
corporations chartered in other states.137 This limitation permits states to
compete with each other to provide the corporate governance doctrines that
will be most appealing to the managers and shareholders who decide where
a company will be chartered.138 As a result, an internal rule that goes too far
in protecting stakeholders will be evaded by corporations that can simply
reincorporate elsewhere. Similarly, institutional investors and the stock
exchanges have enormous capacity to impose policies on public companies,
but a company can avoid their power by going or remaining private.
But external rules can be evaded too, as companies can shift
operations out of a state or out of the country. Internal rules can also be used
to project power — when California imposes internal rules on a company, it
can impact the way that the company treats its employees in Nevada; an
external rule would not have that effect. And again, there is a dynamic

Stacy Cowley, Payday Lending Faces Tough New Restrictions by
Consumer Agency, N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 2017)
135

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/business/payday-loans-cfpb.html (lenders
oppose restrictions on pay-day loans on the ground that “the loans provide
financial lifelines to those in desperate need of cash” and that restrictions “will
create credit deserts for many Americans who do not have access to traditional
banking”); see also Financing Growth: The Impact of Financial Regulation , U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (June 16, 2016),
https://www.uschamber.com/report/financing-growth-the-impact-financialregulation (asserting that Dodd-Frank act is making it more difficult for
“companies of all sizes . . . to access the financial services they need”).
136
See Part II.B, supra.
137
E.g., Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 302 & cmt. a.
138
Cf. Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 Tulane L.
Rev. 339 (2018) (internal affairs rule prevents shareholders from moving to a
jurisdiction with more favorable laws after their investment has been priced and
made).
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interaction between external and internal rules. 139 External rules can help
limit the impact of competition regarding internal rules — a higher federal
minimum wage would limit the impact of greater worker power within
corporate governance, because firms would not be able to gain as much of a
competitive advantage by squeezing workers. And internal rules can help
limit the impact of competition regarding external rules — a corporation with
genuinely empowered workers is less likely to shift jobs to a state where
workers face lower wages or safety protections. As a result, there is little
reason to believe that competition among jurisdictions will systematically
undermine a healthy dynamic between internal and external rules.
Fourth, corporations might offer up soft and temporary internal
changes strategically, to dissipate the force of any drive toward external
reform.140 But this mechanism would only work if reformers and the public
systematically overestimate the impact of internal changes. As discussed,
there are good reasons to doubt that is the case. 141
2.

Corporate Influence on the Voting Public

Even apart from their influence on the political process, corporate
behavior can influence the attitudes of ordinary voters. The issue is an object
of current empirical inquiry, and conclusions must be framed carefully and
tentatively.142 But corporate action could help voters accept the need for and
feasibility of reform.
Some voters may not believe that a problem exists, or that it can be
addressed at a realistic cost. To the extent those voters trust business leaders
on the issues, corporate action can help persuade them.143 A voter may not
believe the Environmental Protection Agency’s pronouncements on the
139

Leo E. Strine, Jr., Aneil Kovvali & Oluwatomi Williams, Lifting Labor’s

Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice And Power Within
American Corporate Governance, 106 Minn. L. Rev. --- (forthcoming 2022).
See Reich, supra note 32.
See supra Part II.B.
E.g., Ash Gillis, et al., Convincing conservatives: Private sector action can
bolster support for climate change mitigation in the United States , 73 Energy
140
141
142

Research & Social Science 101947 (2021) (finding that business action on climate
change persuaded conservatives that problem was real, but tended to reduce
concern over the issue); David A. Dana & Janice Nadler, Regulation, Public
Attitudes, and Private Governance, 16 J. of Empirical Legal Stud. 69 (2019)
(presenting two empirical studies suggesting that corporate action on a problem can
cause conservatives to support regulation); Neil Malhotra, Benoit Monin &
Michael Tomz, Does Private Regulation Preempt Public Regulation?, 113 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 19 (2018) (experiment showing that broad voluntary adoption of a
relatively weak environmental program persuaded relevant groups not to press for
more draconian regulation).
143
Dana & Nadler, supra note 142 at 72.
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danger of pollution or the feasibility of control mechanisms, out of a sense
that the agency is corrupt, disconnected from the practical world of business,
or indifferent to effects on employment. For such a voter, a statement by the
Chief Executive Officer of Wal-Mart on the dangers of pollution and
feasibility of control may carry more weight.
Other voters may not want to believe that a problem exists because
they are fundamentally opposed to a governmental solution. If businesses
propose a private solution, they may be more willing to accept that there is a
problem.144 This type of motivated reasoning can be powerful, and it is
understandable: a voter might believe that the threat from a government
intervention would far exceed any threat from the underlying problem, and
simply decline to waste cognitive or emotional resources fretting about the
problem. When told that businesses are intervening, they are freed to accept
the reality of the issue.
Translating these effects into support for external regulation can be
complicated, and can depend on the specific issue. Even if voters are
persuaded that a problem is real and could be addressed at acceptable cost,
they may come to believe that the problem is already being dealt with by
businesses and that further action by the government is inadvisable. 145 But the
effect is not assured, particularly for low-salience issues. 146 And there may be
less danger of dampened enthusiasm for external reforms if only some
businesses take action, as a newly-mobilized public may demand that the
laggards be forced to improve.147 In any event, convincing a broad swathe of
the public of the reality of a problem is not a small feat — indeed, it is often
outside the reach of public authorities.
3.

Corporate Influence on Costs and Benefits of
External Reforms

Corporate decisions can also affect the substantive impact of potential
regulation, affecting the likelihood of their adoption. When a firm takes steps
to help stakeholders, it changes facts on the ground in a way that affects the
potential for future external regulation. For example, suppose that a
company invests in retrofitting a facility with a pollution control technology
that brings its emissions significantly below existing legal standards. A
regulator weighing the costs and benefits of imposing a more stringent
Gillis, et al., supra note 142 at 2.
Malhotra, Monin & Tomz, supra note 142 at 20.
146
Dana & Nadler, supra note 142 (finding that business efforts on cage-free
eggs and the use of antibiotics in the food supply increased conservative support
for regulation).
147
See Malhotra, Monin & Tomz, supra note 142 (when only a few firms
participate in a voluntary program, it does not affect support for regulation).
144
145
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standard will be more likely to take action, because the costs would have
already been incurred and the feasibility of compliance would have been
proven. The firm itself would also have an economic incentive to encourage
regulators to take action, because it would force competitors to make similar
costly investments.148
Indeed, effects can operate in a more fundamental way than simple
cost benefit analysis. As Professors Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner
have documented, administrative agencies often survey practices of
companies within an industry and adopt a rule somewhere in the middle of
the distribution.149 If managers adopt more stringent practices, agencies that
take a norming approach may adopt more stringent regulations in response.
More subtly, internal reforms can work synergistically with external
reforms. This effect has long been understood in the opposite direction, as
robust external regulation can make internal reforms more plausible:
corporate managers can be made less accountable to shareholders if they will
be more accountable to empowered stakeholders and vigorous government
regulators.150 But by increasing the value and impact of an external
intervention, an internal reform can make external interventions more
valuable and thus more likely. For example, the federal government should
be more willing to engage in a macroeconomic intervention — such as
lowering the cost of borrowing — if firms will use that stimulus to create jobs
instead of enriching shareholders.151

Cf. Aneil Kovvali, Essential Businesses and Shareholder Value, 2021 U.
Chi. Legal F. 191; Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with
Incrementalism, 158 U. Penn. L. Rev. 815, 838 (2010) (a firm that has been
subjected to regulation may lobby to increase the regulation of its competitors
“either to raise their marginal costs or to drive some out of business”).
149
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Norming in Administrative Law, 68
Duke L.J. 1383 (2019).
150
Strine, Kovvali & Williams, supra note 139 (urging that internal measures
to increase worker voice at corporations will be more successful if supported by
external regulations that facilitate organization and set a robust baseline); William
W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins:
Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. Corp. L. 99, 104-05 (2008)
(corporate directors can be focused on the public interest that entails being
cooperative with a vigorous government). Internal rule changes could also affect
the content of external rules for the better by altering corporate lobbying and
reducing rent-seeking. See supra Part II.C.1.
151
Cf. Aneil Kovvali, Countercyclical Corporate Governance, 101 N.C. L.
Rev. (forthcoming); Erica Werner, Seung Min Kim, Rachel Bade & Jeff Stein,
148

Senate falls far short of votes needed to advance coronavirus bill, as clash between
Republicans and Democrats intensifies, Wash. Post (Mar. 22, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/03/22/vast-coronavirus-stimulusbill-limbo-crunch-times-arrives-capitol-hill/ (economic relief package failed to pass
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Proposals to increase worker power in corporations can also draw on
these effects. An internal corporate governance reform like codetermination
— which would place worker representatives on corporate boards of directors
— may not succeed without empowered unions and better corporate
disclosures on worker issues.152 But external reforms to empower unions or
force companies to disclose information on worker issues may not have the
maximum effect if workers are not able to use that power and information to
press for change within the corporation. An internal reform can create an
environment in which external reforms are more effective, thus increasing the
likelihood of external reforms.
III.

Applications

This Part focuses on concrete applications. Part III.A examines race
and social justice. Part III.B considers climate change. Part III.C considers
efforts to constrain internal corporate reform and ensure a government
monopoly on policymaking.
A.

Race and Social Justice

Current and past racial discrimination have had a powerful impact on
the structure of the American economy. Internal corporate governance
reform could play a meaningful role in arresting or reversing these effects, at
least relative to likely external reforms.
1.

Capacity to Adopt Multiple Reforms

Federal and state regulators have demonstrated limited willingness
and capacity to advance external reforms addressing racial justice issues. As
of this writing, much of the national political conversation regarding race is
consumed with a debate about the teaching of “critical race theory” that has
led numerous state governments to enact prohibitions on teaching a broad
range of perspectives on the role of race in American history.153 Recent years

in part due to concerns that companies would channel funds to shareholders and
managers).
152
Cf. Strine, Kovvali & Williams, supra note 139.
153
The quotation marks are used advisedly, as the conversation does not
appear to focus on the actual academic critical race theory. A full discussion of
this phenomenon would be outside the scope of this Article. For coverage of the
origins of the conversation, see Benjamin Wallace-Wells, How a Conservative
Activist Invented the Conflict Over Critical Race Theory, New Yorker (June 18,
2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-inquiry/how-a-conservativeactivist-invented-the-conflict-over-critical-race-theory. For examples of state
prohibitions on teaching adopted in response, see Cathryn Stout & Gabrielle
LaMarr LeMee, Efforts to restrict teaching about racism and bias have multiplied
across the U.S., Chalkbeat (July 14, 2021),

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067505

Forthcoming Columbia Law Review

43

have also seen a shocking rise in racist sentiments in some quarters. Given
the need for a broad consensus to overcome legislative inertia, these attitudes
are likely enough to prevent meaningful external reform.
There are also doctrinal hurdles to external reform: the modern
judiciary’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would seriously
complicate many conscious governmental efforts to address racial inequity,
and indeed, it has already complicated state government efforts to improve
corporate outcomes.154 Because of this doctrinal difficulty, Congress’s rare
efforts to address the legacy of racism have become mired in litigation. 155 It
would thus be difficult to survey the current environment and find grounds
for great optimism about the prospects for meaningful external reform. The
actors who could initiate an external reform are either uninterested or are
operating in an environment that makes action difficult.
The conversation on the corporate front has been quite different.
There has been some governmental action. California adopted a statute
analogous to the women on boards statute requiring each covered
corporation to include some minimum number of directors from
underrepresented communities on its board.156
But the real action has been driven by purely internal processes.
Shareholders have had strong reasons to use their power within corporations
to push for better outcomes. First, there is a convergence of interests between
shareholders and under-represented minority groups in terms of encouraging
real voice within the corporate power structure: without such an internal
voice, corporations will not be able to manage social risks and may become
out of step with the broader society in ways that are dangerous to the bottom
line.157
https://www.chalkbeat.org/22525983/map-critical-race-theory-legislation-teachingracism (collecting bills and other measures).
154
Chris Brummer & Leo Strine, Duty and Diversity, 75 Vand. L. Rev. 1
(2022) (discussing constitutional challenges to state statutes requiring diversity on
corporate boards). Cf. Meland v. Weber, 2 F.4th 838 (9th Cir. 2021) (permitting
suit by shareholder challenging state mandate requiring gender diversity on
corporate boards).
155
See, e.g., Wynn v. Vilsack, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2021 WL 2580678 (M.D.
Fla. June 23, 2021) (granting preliminary injunction preventing the Department of
Agriculture from implementing a congressionally authorized program for debt
relief for minority farmers).
156
Cal. Corp. Code § 301.4.
157
See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73
Vand. L. Rev. 1401 (2020). The moment may provide a particularly stark
illustration of Professor Derrick A. Bell, Jr.’s interest-convergence thesis. See, e.g.,
Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why
Diversity Lags in America’s Boardrooms and What to Do About It?, 61 Wash. &
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As one telling example, the pizza company Papa John’s suffered a
substantial stock price decline and considerable volatility as a result of
statements by its founder, John Schnatter. The stock lost almost a third of its
value after Schnatter commented on the National Football League’s handling
of player protests against racism and police brutality; the effect of those
comments was exacerbated by reports that he had used a racial slur on a
company call.158 A lack of competence and sensitivity on racial issues did not
simply create a moral problem for the company — it created a financial
problem for shareholders, which they would have an incentive to solve using
the ordinary machinery of corporate governance.
Second, racial discrimination within firms can also sometimes be
understood as a form of agency problem, in which directors and officers
shortchange shareholders by using discrimination against qualified candidates
to gratify themselves or to exclude competitors for their positions. Indeed,
the basic premise of disclosure as a strategy for addressing racial issues
assumes that shareholders have an interest in curing discrimination at the
companies that they own.159 This convergence of interest likely does not
extend to external measures, such as redistributive taxation and spending
programs.

Lee L. Rev. 1583 (2004) (suggesting that a coalition in favor of board diversity is
possible); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980).
158
Brummer & Strine, supra note 154 (noting that Schnatter’s behavior
damaged Papa John’s competitive position); Barzuza, Curtis & Webber, supra
note 95 at 1298-99 (“Papa John’s, a once-thriving company, suffered massive
business harm after its founder was publicly accused of making racist comments.”);
Tiffany Hsu, Papa John’s Founder, John Schnatter, to Leave Board After Nasty
Leadership Fight, N.Y. Times (Mar. 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/business/papa-johns-john-schnatter.html.
159
See Nasdaq, Nasdaq to Advance Diversity through New Proposed Listing
Requirements (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/nasdaq-toadvance-diversity-through-new-proposed-listing-requirements-2020-12-01
(announcing proposed disclosure framework for listed companies); Jessie K. Liu,
Susan Saltzstein, Lauren Aguiar & Tansy Woan, Skadden Offers a Scorecard on
Diversity
in
the
Corporate
Boardroom
(July
14,
2021),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2021/07/14/skadden-offers-a-scorecard-ondiversity-in-the-corporate-boardroom/ (collecting state statutes and showing that
disclosure is a common strategy); Courtney Murray & Eric Talley, Racial Diversity
and Corporate Governance: Assessing California’s New Board Diversity Mandate,
CLS
Blue
Sky
Blog
(Oct.
28,
2020),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/10/28/racial-diversity-and-corporategovernance-assessing-californias-new-board-diversity-mandate/
(describing
disclosure mandates in Illinois and Canada).
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Third, there is a body of empirical literature suggesting that diversity
improves decision-making by eliminating groupthink and enhancing
deliberations.160 These findings are contested.161 But to the extent the findings
are accepted, it would suggest that shareholders benefit from having diverse
directors and corporate executives. Again, this convergence of interest is
likely to be limited to internal corporate reforms.
Fourth, there are reasons for optimism in social trends among the
investor class. It remains the case that shareholders are disproportionately
white.162 But the rising generation of millennial investors is more diverse than
any previous American generation, and it holds more progressive views than
prior generations. As institutional investors compete for millennial dollars,
they will have good reason to deploy engagement and voting power to
advance a policy agenda consistent with millennial preferences. 163 Companies
themselves are likely to be receptive to such approaches, as they compete to
win over millennial customers and recruit millennial employees.
Recent state efforts to restrict voting rights offer a potential test case
for these forces. After the 2020 presidential election, various state
governments sought to impose new limits on voting. Corporations
responding to shareholder, employee, and customer pressure have attacked
these measures as oppressive.164 While the effectiveness of these corporate
See, e.g., Brummer & Strine, supra note 154 (surveying the literature, and
concluding that there is an adequate basis for business judgment that diversity
creates shareholder value); Ramirez, supra note 157 at 1587 (“Diversity in the
boardroom enhances corporate profitability according to the consensus of scholars
of business management, finance, and economics.”).
161
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, California’s
‘Women on Boards’ Statute and the Scope of Regulatory Competition , 20 Eur.
Bus. Org. L. Rev. 493, 507 (2019) (“the results of empirical studies evaluating the
relationship between female board representation and corporate economic
performance have been ‘largely inconclusive’”).
162
This has implications for the racial impact of shareholder primacy, which
asks corporations to prioritize the interests of disproportionately white
shareholders over the interests of disproportionately Black and Hispanic workers.
See, e.g., Lenore Palladino, The Contribution of Shareholder Primacy to the
Racial Wealth Gap, Roosevelt Institute (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/the-contribution-of-shareholder-primacyto-the-racial-wealth-gap/.
163
See Barzuza, Curtis & Webber, supra note 95 at 1243.
164
See, e.g., David Gelles, Inside Corporate America’s Frantic Response to
the Georgia Voting Law, N.Y. Times (Apr. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/05/business/voting-rights-ceos.html; David
Gelles, Delta and Coca-Cola Reverse Course on Georgia Voting Law, Stating
‘Crystal Clear’ Opposition, N.Y. Times (Mar. 31, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/business/delta-coca-cola-georgia-votinglaw.html.
160
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steps can be debated,165 it would be difficult to claim that they interfered with
the passage of more effective federal laws.166 It is hard to imagine meaningful
voting rights bills passing in the current Congress. And the current Supreme
Court has demonstrated serious hostility to federal voting rights legislation. 167
Internal forces driving corporate change did not interfere with external
reforms; they have simply continued to operate on a parallel track at a time
when external reforms were unlikely to proceed.
2.

Reformer Expectations

There is also little reason to believe that reformers are systematically
overestimating the value of internal advocacy or underestimating the
prospects of external reform. To begin, internal corporate changes can have
a real impact. No one corporation can end racial inequality in America, but
individual decisions by individual corporations can create actual benefits.
Every hiring or governance decision tainted by racism could be improved,
and even if no other corporation took comparable action, there would be a
benefit for the people who would have been harmed. 168
Some companies also have an outsized capacity to affect outcomes by
shifting the national culture and conversation. When Nike released an
advertising campaign embracing Colin Kaepernick, the former professional
quarterback who led a protest movement against police brutality and was
driven out of the National Football League as a result, the unveiling video was
viewed over 80 million times on Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube.169 Nike
enjoyed substantial benefits from the campaign, obtaining record engagement

See infra Part III.A.3.
E.g. Nicholas Fandos, Republicans block a sweeping voting rights bill,
dealing Biden and Democrats a defeat, N.Y. Times (July 2, 2021),
165
166

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/06/22/us/joe-biden-news#manchin-votingrights-filibuster.
167
For a recent example, see Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee,
141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021) (adopting narrow interpretation of the Voting Rights Act).
For a broader critical perspective, see Michael Klarman, Foreword: The
Degradation of American Democracy—and the Court, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2020).
168
These marginal decisions can also be taken quickly and in relative secrecy,
decreasing the potential for racial backlash. See Deborah C. Malamud,
Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class , 68 U. Colo. L. Rev.
939, 944 (1997) (“Private businesses are private, and so long as the [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission] was on their side, they could work out
their [affirmative action] programs in the seclusion of their own headquarters or at
the negotiating table with their own unions.”).
169
Julie Creswell, Kevin Draper & Sapna Maheshwari, Nike Nearly Dropped
Colin Kaepernick Before Embracing Him, N.Y. Times (Sep. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/sports/nike-colin-kaepernick.html.
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and hitting a new all-time high on its share price. 170 When player protests
restarted, the N.F.L. adopted a far more conciliatory attitude. 171
Of course, the fact that the internal path to reform seems more
promising than the external path to reform does not make it a perfect
solution. There are meaningful limits on the ability of private law and private
entities to undo racial inequity. Legal structures and innovations that help to
grow wealth will tend to exacerbate inequality.172 But there is little indication
that reformers are unaware of these points, or that they have traded away a
feasible external reform because they have misunderstood.
3.

Dynamic Interactions Between Reforms

When corporations are mobilized to act on racial issues by internal
forces, they can have an effect on external regulation. For example, Delta
Airlines claimed to have had this type of impact on Georgia’s 2021 law
restricting voting.
The company’s public approach was initially cautious. In a relatively
mild and equivocal statement following the bill’s passage, Delta asserted:
Over the past several weeks, Delta engaged
extensively with state elected officials in both parties
to express our strong view that Georgia must have a
fair and secure election process, with broad voter
participation and equal access to the polls. The
legislation signed this week improved considerably
during the legislative process . . . . Nonetheless, we
understand concerns remain over other provisions in
the legislation, and there continues to be work ahead
in this effort. . . .173

170

Id.

Ken Belson, N.F.L. Kicks Off Season With Nods to Unrest and Focus on
Anthem, N.Y. Times (Sep. 13, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/13/sports/football/nfl-protests.html.
172
For a stark illustration of this point, see Mehrsa Baradaran, The Color of
Money (2017). As Professor Baradaran describes, the movement to support
Black-owned banks lacked the capacity to break down inequality because the
Black community had been denied wealth and lacked access to high quality
investment opportunities. Without a government effort to address those broader
problems through subsidies and regulations, private institutions could not succeed.
173
Delta statement on SB202, Delta News Hub (Mar. 26, 2021),
https://news.delta.com/delta-statement-sb202.
171
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But after the initial statement drew criticism, Delta’s CEO Ed Bastian
issued a less equivocal statement that insisted that the company had
successfully lobbied against some voter suppression measures in the bill:
. . . Last week, the Georgia legislature passed a
sweeping voting reform act that could make it harder
for many Georgians, particularly those in our Black
and Brown communities, to exercise their right to
vote. Since the bill’s inception, Delta joined other
major Atlanta corporations to work closely with
elected officials from both parties, to try and remove
some of the most egregious measures from the bill.

We had some success in eliminating the most
suppressive tactics that some had proposed.
However, I need to make it crystal clear that the final
bill is unacceptable and does not match Delta’s values.
. . . So there is much work ahead, and many more
opportunities to have an impact.174
Delta’s quiet and behind-the-scenes approach before the bill was
passed drew substantial criticism.175 Cynically, it may have allowed Delta to
reassure stakeholders that it was taking steps without requiring Delta to offend
powerful Georgia legislators. But the company’s statements after the bill
passed suggest that fear of Georgia legislators played a limited role in the
company’s decision-making, and Delta’s approach may have reflected a
reasonable calculation regarding the most effective strategy.176 If statements
by Delta and other companies are to be believed, the approach also had some
impact on the external process.
Corporations activated by internal concerns may also have had a role
in shaping constitutional doctrine on race. In a landmark decision permitting
affirmative action in higher education, the Supreme Court’s majority decision
explicitly cited arguments from the business community in support:
[The benefits of student body diversity] are not
theoretical but real, as major American businesses
have made clear that the skills needed in today’s
Ed Bastian memo: Your right to vote, Delta News Hub (Mar. 31, 2021),
https://news.delta.com/ed-bastian-memo-your-right-vote (emphasis added).
175
Gelles, Inside Corporate America’s Frantic Response, supra note 164.
176
See Chip Cutter, Suzanne Vranica & Alison Sider, With Georgia Voting
Law, the Business of Business Becomes Politics, Wall St. J. (Apr. 10, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/with-georgia-voting-law-the-business-of-businessbecomes-politics-11618027250 (quoting Bastian’s argument that speaking out
before the bill was passed would have meant that the company “lost a seat at the
table”).
174
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increasingly global marketplace can only be
developed through exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. Brief for 3m et al. as
Amici Curiae.177
These effects should not be overstated. But corporations do have
substantial influence over the legislative and judicial processes. When
internal forces cause corporations to recognize the importance of progress on
race, that muscle can be put to real use.
B.

Climate Change

Climate change has also been an important area for debate by internal
and external reformers. While external regulations are critical to driving
changes, internal reforms may play a constructive role by supplementing and
accelerating the effect of the external measures.
1.

Capacity to Adopt Multiple Reforms

Federal regulatory progress on carbon emissions has been frustrating
and fitful. Enacting new legislation is difficult. As of this writing, the median
voter in the Senate is Joe Manchin. His home state of West Virginia was
historically economically dependent on production of coal, one of the dirtiest
fossil fuels. Absent new legislation, action by administrative agencies is
impermanent. The Trump Administration made serious efforts to
undermine or eliminate Obama Administration policies on climate change.178
States can only make limited progress because of legal doctrine and
competitive dynamics.179
The internal path is more complicated. There are two basic avenues
for internal reforms to affect corporate behavior: companies might anticipate
external regulation and change their behavior accordingly, and companies
might act independently of external regulation.
(a) Anticipating External Reforms. When internal forces compel a
company to take action in anticipation of an external regulation, the internal
reform ultimately depends on the capacity of public actors to take action. If

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
Not all of these efforts were successful. The Trump Administration’s
attempt to eliminate the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plant was dealt a
fatal blow on President Trump’s last day in office. See Am. Lung Assoc. v. EPA,
985 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (striking down Trump Administration’s Affordable
Clean Energy Rule and its embedded repeal of the Obama Administration’s Clean
Power Plan).
179
See supra notes 82 to 83 and accompanying text.
177
178
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the federal government is known to be completely unable to enact meaningful
reform, this mechanism of action would be disabled.
But internal mechanisms can have important effects. Imagine that a
company was considering making an investment in 2017, and that the
profitability of the investment would depend on carbon regulations: examples
of such investments might include a pipe or rail line transporting fossil fuels,
a mine or well extracting fossil fuels, an electric plant burning fossil fuels, or
a factory manufacturing a product that will burn fossil fuels. If the regulatory
environment is favorable, the project will have operating profits and break
even in six years. If the regulatory environment is unfavorable, the project
will operate at a loss and will not break even. The company anticipates a
favorable environment until the next presidential election; if the incumbent
is reelected, the favorable environment will continue, but if a democratic
challenger wins, the environment will become unfavorable.
The internal mechanisms of corporate decision-making can have at
least three effects. First, it can smooth or even amplify the expected effect of
regulation. Instead of swinging wildly from an approach calibrated for one
regulatory regime to an approach calibrated for a different regulatory regime
based on the outcome of an election, a firm can anticipate potential changes
and chart a middle course.180 Second, it can accelerate the impact of potential
regulation. The firm’s decisions in 2017 are based in part on its guesses about
the potential for new regulation in 2021. For an urgent problem like climate
change, changing behavior today may be extremely valuable. Third, changes
in corporate decisions can change the likelihood of stringent regulation. 181
The mechanisms of corporate governance will have an important role
to play in channeling these effects when markets are not perfect. Markets
may not properly evaluate the likelihood of regulatory reforms. 182 And firms
may have important inside information about the impact of a potential
Internal firm decision-making can also amplify the impact of an expected
regulation. If the expected impact of regulation—that is, the average impact of
favorable and unfavorable regulations weighted for the likelihood of Republican
and Democratic victory — makes the expected profits of the project negative, the
firm may avoid the project. That outcome would be indistinguishable from the
firm treating a Democratic victory as a certainty.
181
See infra Part III.B.3.
182
Financial markets have often struggled to predict Washington’s behavior,
particularly under crisis conditions. E.g., Anna Hirtenstein & Paul Vigna, Stocks
Slide on Coronavirus Uptick, Fading Stimulus Hopes, Wall St. J. (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-stock-markets-dow-update-10-26-202011603706439 (describing market correction “after Congress and the White House
failed to agree on a much anticipated fiscal stimulus deal”); Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Too Big to Fail (2009) (describing collapse in financial markets after Congress
initially failed to pass rescue package).
180
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regulation—the company may uniquely be in possession of information about
the likely emissions from the project, and about its profitability. In such an
environment, managers may be able to temporarily boost stock prices and
annual bonuses by investing in the dirty project, even if the expected value of
the project is negative: in effect, corporate managers would be signaling to
stockholders that they believe regulations are unlikely or that the project is
unusually clean or profitable.183 The internal mechanisms of corporate
governance are essential in countering these effects, addressing the basic
agency problem and focusing attention on long term problems. 184
The recent success of activist hedge fund Engine No. 1 in unseating
members of Exxon Mobil Corp.’s board of directors may be a useful
example. Exxon had been a troubled company for some time. The
company’s strategy of doubling down on fossil fuels by making large
investments in production had resulted in major losses, particularly during
the coronavirus pandemic—the company took a $20 billion loss in 2020
alone. Engine No. 1 was able to persuade a coalition of shareholders to vote
out various directors and replace them with new candidates focused on
transitioning the company to cleaner technologies that would succeed when
oil prices were low and regulators were more aggressive. 185 Shareholder votes
are usually a routine rubber stamp for management-approved directors. But
with shareholders expecting new regulations, this normally boring internal
process became an avenue for change.
Not all paths have been so straightforward. For example, during most
of the Trump Administration, General Motors and its Chief Executive
Officer Mary Barra advocated against tough standards on vehicle emissions.186
Shortly after Biden defeated Trump in the 2020 presidential election, Barra

See Madison Condon, Market Myopia’s Climate Bubble, 2022 Utah L.
Rev. 63; Armour, Gordon & Min, supra note 78 (managers may avoid making
efficient investments in compliance measures because large investments would
signal to the market that the firm faces a high risk of liability).
184
Condon, supra note 183. Government regulation can have an important
role in facilitating these processes. For example, mandating securities disclosures
on “stranded assets” or the anticipated effects of regulation would help markets
evaluate projects more accurately and limit the need for corporate governance to
take special account of these problems.
185
For one account, see Justin Baer & Dawn Lim, The Hedge-Fund Manager
Who Did Battle With Exxon—and Won, Wall St. J. (June 12, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-hedge-fund-manager-who-did-battle-withexxonand-won-11623470420.
186
Paul A. Eisenstein, GM turns on Trump, now supports California’s tough
emissions rules, NBC News (Nov. 24, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/gm-turns-trump-now-supports-californias-tough-emissions-rules-n1248799.
183
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reversed course on regulations.187 And shortly after the Biden Administration
took office, Barra announced that General Motors would phase out
traditional automobiles in favor of electric vehicles by 2035. 188 If General
Motors anticipated tougher external regulatory action on climate change and
sought to position itself as a leader, the anecdote does not show that internal
corporate reform is a more promising path than external reform. The
company’s back and forth also suggests limited success in smoothing or
accelerating the impact of external regulation.
(b) Independent Internal Reform. Internal reforms can proceed even
without the potential for external reforms. For example, General Motors
might have been reacting to internal forces such as shareholder preferences
that are entirely separate from potential government regulation. There are
good reasons to think that might be the case. The electric vehicle and clean
energy company Tesla, Inc. currently trades at a much higher share price to
earnings ratio than General Motors: stockholders apparently believe that
Tesla is worth more than General Motors, even though Tesla currently
manufactures far fewer cars and makes far less money.189 Even if General
Motors was not concerned about external regulations, it would have good
internal reasons to service its shareholders by attempting to tap into Tesla’s
share price magic.
And indeed, some scholars have suggested that shareholders would
benefit from corporate action to reduce carbon emissions, even absent the
prospect of external regulation. Professor Madison Condon has argued that
climate change presents a systemic risk that investors cannot avoid through
diversification.190 A diversified investor is thus forced to take on the full risk
associated with climate change, and has a real incentive to use their voting
187

Id. (“General Motors . . . reversed course and no longer supports

President Donald Trump’s plan to prevent California from setting its own
automotive emissions standards. . . . The GM announcement on California’s
mandate also happened to come on the day the White House all but formally
conceded the 2020 presidential election, approving the transition process to
President-elect Joe Biden.”).
188
Mike Colias, GM to Phase Out Gas- and Diesel-Powered Vehicles by
2035, Wall St. J. (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gm-sets-2035-targetto-phase-out-gas-and-diesel-powered-vehicles-globally-11611850343.
189
Andrew Nusca & David Z. Morris, Teslanomics: How to justify being the
most valuable car company on earth, Fortune (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://fortune.com/2020/08/10/tesla-most-valuable-car-company-in-the-worldelectric-vehicles-evs/ (noting that at the time, Tesla was worth “more than
quadruple the combined value of American icons General Motors and Ford
Motor, even though the California company sold just 4% of the vehicles the
Detroit duo did last year”).
190
See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 Wash.
L. Rev. 1 (2020).
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power to encourage companies in their portfolio to reduce carbon emissions.
And index funds, which have the perspective of a diversified investor, do in
fact seem to be signaling a desire to see portfolio companies cut down on
carbon emissions.191
At some companies, working on climate issues can also contribute to
traditional drivers of shareholder value. Wal-Mart’s Gigaton Project seeks to
avoid one billion tons of greenhouse gas emissions in the company’s supply
chain by 2030. Although Wal-Mart’s environmental efforts have had an
impact on a scale comparable to a major government program, they began
when an activist convinced company leadership that environmental work was
closely aligned with the company’s core focus on controlling cost and
eliminating waste.192
Admittedly, there are some good reasons to doubt the strength of any
alliance between shareholders and social interests in the area of climate
change. First, shareholders will not internalize the full effects of climate
change. Most obviously, someone who holds a portfolio of public American
companies will not have any exposure to the losses experienced by a farmer
in Bangladesh.193
Second, to the extent that an American public company does have
exposure to climate change, it is likely to have access to adaptation strategies
that will help insulate shareholders from loss. A firm that sources a key input
from a country that will experience climate change devastation will find an
alternate supplier. Capital is mobile and can flee from the effects of climate
change, often in ways that actual human beings cannot. Indeed, climate
change may actually create profitable opportunities for capital to exploit. As
a simple example, there may be opportunities to buy land that will be more
productive because of climate change: a vineyard in Germany may be
underpriced today relative to its potential productivity over the next few
decades.194 GM’s transition to electric vehicles may be a similar phenomenon.

See, e.g., Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, BlackRock
(Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-larryfink-ceo-letter. BlackRock was one of the institutional investors to back changes at
Exxon. See Baer & Lim, supra note 185.
192
See Kim, supra note 132, Edward Humes, Force of Nature: The Unlikely
Story of Walmart’s Green Revolution (2011).
193
See Roberto Tallarita, The Limits of Portfolio Primacy (manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3912977.
194
See Christopher F. Schuetze, ‘Disgusting to Say, but It’s the Truth’:
German Winemakers See Boon in Climate Change, N.Y. Times (Jan. 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/19/world/europe/germany-wine-climatechange.html.
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Society as a whole will not profit from climate change, but smart companies
may find a way.
Third, a diversified investor in America's public markets will have
greater exposure to established players in old industries (e.g., oil giants) than
to the pioneers building things that will benefit from a complete transition
away from carbon (e.g., startups pioneering new technologies, lithium miners
in China).195 Many pioneers are not publicly traded on American markets.
Even if an investor could buy shares in them, it would be impossible to
predict in advance which pioneers will succeed and which will fail. 196 As a
result, a diversified investor may have a vested interest in business as usual,
instead of disruption.
Fourth, action at the margins is not likely to have any effect. One
marginal ton of carbon emissions would have little impact on the magnitude
of climate change. Only a small handful of companies operate at such a scale
that their decisions could have a meaningful impact on the phenomenon.197
As a result, even if an investor expects to suffer from climate change, it is not
clear that they would want a company to spend shareholder money to reduce
carbon emissions.
Finally, even if shareholders wanted effective action against climate
change, they would likely prefer external action to internal action. External
action on racial inequity would likely be painful for a rich white shareholder,
who therefore would have an incentive to support alternative internal
measures that could maintain social stability in their absence. But a Green
New Deal would not be especially painful for a diversified investor, who
195

See Tallarita, supra note 193.

This is not simply a matter of having an appropriate time horizon or
vision. Many car companies went broke in the early years of the automotive
industry. Ford Motor Company was Henry Ford’s third attempt at starting a
successful car company. See M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford
Motor Company: Everything Old is New Again, in Corporate Law Stories 37, 39
(J. Mark Ramseyer, ed. 2009) (Henry Ford’s “first two companies, the Detroit
Automobile Company and the Henry Ford Company, made no cars and no
profits”).
197
This is not to say that there are no companies that could have an impact.
Walmart’s Project Gigaton seeks to avoid one billion metric tons of greenhouse
gas emissions in its supply chain by 2030. See Kim, supra note 132, Edward
Humes, Force of Nature: The Unlikely Story of Walmart’s Green Revolution
(2011). See also Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role
of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 913, 927-28
(2007) (describing scale of Wal-Mart and other firms, and the impact of their
adoption of environmental standards). Groups of firms can also improve
outcomes through concerted action coordinated through private governance
mechanisms like certification schemes. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private
Environmental Governance, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 129 (2013).
196
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would be able to offload some of the costs of the transition away from carbon
onto society while potentially profiting from new government projects and
subsidies.
But while these factors may reduce the likelihood that purely internal
processes will yield adequate results, they do not suggest that internal changes
would cannibalize or prevent external changes. Reformers can travel along
both the internal and external paths simultaneously.
2.

Reformer Expectations

Reformers do not appear likely to trade away an effective external
regulation for an ineffective internal reform. Commentators on corporate
issues are already attentive to the threat of “greenwashing,” in which
companies mouth platitudes about the environment without making changes
to their operations.198 Regulators have also taken note.199 Groups that are
focused on environmental issues are not likely to be satisfied by empty
promises.
There is also little evidence that reformers are ignoring the potential
for external regulation. It would be difficult to criticize political progressives
for a lack of ambition on climate change. The “Green New Deal” package
championed by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator
Edward J. Markey set bold targets, including the goal of “meeting 100 percent
of the power demand in the United States through clean, renewable, and
zero-emission energy sources.”200 The stimulus and infrastructure legislation
pursued by Democrats after President Joe Biden’s election also calls for
extensive efforts on climate change.201 It is hard to see how reformers could
obtain more powerful external measures by abandoning efforts to encourage
corporations to behave better.

E.g., Paul Polman, Corporate greenwashing is all the rage. How can we
stop it?, Fortune (Apr. 11, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/04/11/greenwashing198

esg-businesses-corporations-climate-change/.
199
E.g. Rohit Chopra, Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding
the FTC EnergyGuide Rule, Federal Trade Commission (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1585238/20201222_
final_chopra_statement_on_energyguide_rule.pdf.
200
H. Res. 109, 116th Cong. § 2(c), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/house-resolution/109/text.
201
E.g. Lisa Friedman & Jim Tankersley, Biden’s Recovery Plan Bets Big on
Clean Energy, N.Y. Times (July 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/23/climate/biden-infrastructure-stimulusclimate-change.html.
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3.

Dynamic Interactions Between Reforms

Internal changes may also make external changes more likely. First,
if a few key corporations start to move toward greener behavior, it may
substantially improve the prospects for external regulations by changing the
cost-benefit ratio.202 GM going all-electric voluntarily will make it cheaper for
the government to require car companies to make the transition, much as the
energy industry's natural transition away from coal made it cheaper to impose
tighter emission standards. The move would also make it impossible to claim
that tighter requirements were technically or economically infeasible.
Second, if a major corporation is a leader, it would also have good
reason to put its political muscle into seeking regulations that force its
competitors to meet standards of conduct that its competitors do not want to
meet.203 This effect can be amplified by a major corporation’s capacity to
enlist stakeholders. When Ford announced plans to build an electric truck
using union labor in plants in the Midwest, it effectively recruited important
constituencies to the project of electric vehicle manufacturing.204
Third, action by major companies can change cultural meanings.
Ford kicked off its electrification plans by announcing an electric version of
the Ford F-150 pickup truck — a vehicle associated with tough, utilitarian
applications.205 When electric vehicles were only for environmentalists
looking to curb emissions or wealthy people looking for a flashy toy, they
could easily be rejected by a substantial portion of the American population.
A savvy bit of marketing, backed by Ford’s scale and industrial might, has the
potential to change the cultural meaning of electric vehicles in a way that
would make for a more congenial environment for pro-electric vehicle
regulation.
Finally, political actors seem to think the internal process is a threat.
As discussed below,206 Republicans have sought to curtail internal processes
for addressing environmental and social issues. The most straightforward
explanation is that Republican officials wanted to ensure that reform could
only happen through the external regulatory process, because they believed
that they can control and limit the external process in a way that they did not
202
203
204

Supra Part II.C.
See Levmore, supra note 148 at 838.
Neal E. Boudette, Ford’s Electric F-150 Pickup Aims to Be the Model T

of E.V.s, N.Y. Times (May 28, 2021),

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/19/business/ford-electric-vehicle-f-150.html.
205
Id. See also Brian C. Black, Why Ford’s electric F-150 pickup is a turning
point for car culture, Fast Company (June 17, 2021),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90647325/ford-electric-f-150-lightning-truck-of-thefuture.
206
See infra Part III.C.
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control the internal process. If that is right, savvy figures that benefit
politically from a lack of reform believe that the internal pathway is a serious
threat.
C.

Constraining Internal Reform

Groups that have the ability to veto external reforms have an obvious
interest in ensuring that their power cannot be evaded through internal
processes. In recent years, conservative forces have sought to use perches in
government to prevent internal processes from operating. This strongly
suggests that internal processes for reform can have advantages, while
indicating that there are limits on how far they will be allowed to go. Three
recent examples demonstrate the phenomenon.
1.

Managing the Federal Reserve’s COVID Portfolio

In response to the economic crisis prompted by COVID-19, the
Federal Reserve embarked on a massive program under the CARES Act to
purchase billions of dollars of bonds. To handle the program, the Federal
Reserve hired asset manager BlackRock.207
Just a few months before the Federal Reserve engagement,
BlackRock and its CEO, Larry Fink, had taken a prominent role in the
movement toward sustainable investing. Larry Fink had released a letter
which stated in part that “Climate Risk Is Investment Risk,” and that “climateintegrated portfolios can provide better risk-adjusted returns to investors.” 208
This belief led Fink to commit to “making sustainability integral to portfolio
construction and risk management; [and] exiting investments that present a
high sustainability-related risk, such as thermal coal producers . . . .” 209
Apparently concerned that BlackRock would consider climate risk as
it managed the Federal Reserve program, a group of 17 Republican senators
sent a letter to the Treasury Secretary and the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve expressing concern:

See Cezary Podkul & Dawn Lim, Fed Hires BlackRock to Help Calm
Markets. Its ETF Business Wins Big., Wall St. J. (Sep. 18, 2020),
207

https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-hires-blackrock-to-help-calm-markets-its-etfbusiness-wins-big-11600450267; Matthew Goldstein, Fed Releases Details of
BlackRock Deal for Virus Response, N.Y. Times (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/business/coronavirus-blackrock-federalreserve.html.
208
Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, BlackRock (Jan. 20,
2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-larry-fink-ceoletter.
209
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Industries like the energy and transportation sectors
are facing significant economic challenges as the
demand for products and services have dropped
with the constraints on the economy. We urge you
to ensure that the financial relief offered under the
CARES Act is fully available to companies
throughout the economy.
Some outside groups have already advocated that
certain sectors of the economy be excluded from the
loans made available under the CARES Act.
Acquiescing to these demands would be contrary to
Congressional intent and would arbitrarily harm
certain American workers. Both are unacceptable.
...
Earlier this year, BlackRock announced that it would
remove from its discretionary active investment
portfolios the public securities (both debt and equity)
of certain companies. This was a decision made solely
by BlackRock as an individual business decision.
However, we believe that the Federal Reserve should
emphasize that, in carrying out its fiduciary duties . . .
BlackRock must act without regard to this or other
investment policies BlackRock has adopted for its
own funds.210

As Professor Madison Condon has noted, the letter was probably
unnecessary in a narrow sense — BlackRock was never likely to apply its
climate risk tools to the Federal Reserve engagement — but it was part of a
broader partisan effort to use political power to prevent markets from
realigning to account for climate risk.211 It could also have a chilling effect, if
financial institutions reasonably infer that being outspoken on climate change
could cost them profitable opportunities to participate in government
programs.

Kevin Cramer, et al., Letter to the Hon. Steven Mnuchin and the Hon.
Jerome Powell (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://senatorkevincramer.app.box.com/s/981sfgn44nmkr8fq5hhf6xryxro6fyvp.
211
See Madison Condon, The Firm Administering the Coronavirus Rescue
210

Considers Climate Risks in Its Ordinary Investments; Republicans told them not
to this time, Slate (Apr. 20, 2020), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2020/04/republicans-block-blackrock-climate-risk-assesment.html.
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Managing Federal Workers’ Retirement Savings

About 6 million active and retired federal workers save for retirement
through the Thrift Savings Plan, a 401(k)-like defined contribution program
overseen by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (“FRTIB”).
Congress has taken steps to limit the FRTIB’s ability to use the $700 billion
Thrift Savings Plan portfolio to exercise power. The FRTIB is statutorily
directed to provide specific offerings to savers, with each offering either
passively tracking an index or allowing the use of mutual funds. 212 The FRTIB
is also statutorily barred from “exercis[ing] voting rights associated with the
ownership of securities” within the portfolio. 213
As a result, the FRTIB has adopted a largely passive stance. Unlike
its counterparts in the United Kingdom, Japan, and Sweden, the FRTIB has
not taken steps to assess the risks associated with climate change.214 But the
FRTIB relies on two outside asset management firms — BlackRock and State
Street — to manage the portfolio. And the FRTIB does not read the statutory
bar on voting to extend to BlackRock and State Street, instead expecting them
to vote based on their established proxy voting guidelines.
In June 2021, two Republican senators sent a letter to the acting
chairman of the FRTIB expressing alarm at this state of affairs and
demanding a briefing:
[W]hile [BlackRock and State Street’s] proxy voting
guidelines are ostensibly focused on the investor’s
fiduciary advantage, both entities are increasingly
incorporating left-leaning environmental, social, and
corporate governance (“ESG”) priorities into these
guidelines. For example, BlackRock announced that
in 2021 “key changes” in its voting guidelines “address
board quality; the transition to a low-carbon economy;
key stakeholder interests; diversity, equity and
inclusion; alignment of political activities with stated
policy positions; and shareholder proposals.” Not to
be outdone, [State Street’s] CEO stated “our main
stewardship priorities for 2021 will be the systemic
risks associated with climate change and a lack of
racial and ethnic diversity.”
212
213

5 U.S.C. § 8438(b).

Id. § 8438(f).

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Retirement Savings: Federal Workers’
Portfolios Should Be Evaluated For Possible Financial Risks Related to Climate
Change (May 2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-327.pdf. The report
recommended changes.
214
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In light of these concerns, we ask that you provide a
briefing . . . 215
The letter again reflects concern that the internal mechanisms of
shareholder voting could be used to achieve policy outcomes that the senators
disfavor—and would be in a position to prevent if they were sought through
external processes. The letter is also a clear shot across the bow of major
asset managers, suggesting that outspoken support of a “left-leaning” agenda
could damage their ability to do lucrative work with the government.
3.

Rules for Fiduciaries of Retirement Accounts

The Trump Administration similarly sought to deploy its regulatory
muscle to prevent institutional investors from using environmental, social, or
governance criteria when making investments or casting votes. A Department
of Labor rule issued in November 2020 stated that fiduciaries of retirement
and pension funds were only permitted to make investment decisions based
on “pecuniary” factors, and could not consider “non-pecuniary” factors
except as a tie-breaker.216 A companion rule issued in December 2020
provided that fiduciaries could only use their rights as shareholders to
advance the pecuniary interests of the retirement or pension plan, and that
they could choose not to vote on matters that did not have a material financial
impact on the plan’s assets.217 In support of these changes, Trump
Administration Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia stressed his view that
“[p]rivate employer-sponsored retirement plans are not vehicles for
furthering social goals or policy objectives that are not in the financial interest
of the plan.”218
These regulatory changes were put on hold by the Biden
Administration. In a March 2021 statement, the Department of Labor stated
that it intended to revisit the rules and that it would not enforce the rules in
the interim.219 The moves were explained as part of a larger effort to revisit
Trump Administration decisions on matters that relate to climate change.
Letter from Sen. Pat Toomey & Sen. Ron Johnson to FRTIB Acting
Chairman David A. Jones (June 30, 2021),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/toomey_johnson_letter_to_frtib.p
df.
216
Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846 (Nov.
13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 2509, 2550).
217
Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed.
Reg. 81,658 (Dec. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 2509, 2550).
218
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Proposes New Investment
Duties
Rule
(June
23,
2020),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20200623.
219
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Statement Regarding
Enforcement of Its Final Rules on ESG Investments And Proxy Voting By
Employee Benefit Plans (Mar. 10, 2021),
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At an abstract level, it is not obvious that the Trump Administration’s
rules would have prevented fiduciaries from trying to increase the value of an
overall portfolio by limiting climate change or other undesirable social or
environmental problems. But, at a minimum, the rules were plainly intended
to inject uncertainty on that score.220 The Biden Administration suggested
that in the few months that they had been in force, the rules had achieved
their intended effect, and had “already had a chilling effect on appropriate
integration of ESG factors in investment decisions, including in circumstances
that the rules can be read to explicitly allow.”221
These regulatory developments are readily understood as part of a
competition between internal and external modes of reform. People with
power over the external mode are seeking to either limit the internal mode
or authorize it to move forward. On the whole, the dynamic vindicates the
overall thesis of this Article and suggests its limits — the steps implicitly
recognize that corporate reform through internal governance mechanisms
could proceed more easily than reform through external government
regulation on certain hot-button topics, while suggesting that the government
will act in some cases to protect its exclusive hold on power.
But the limits are unlikely to be too constricting for the processes of
internal corporate reform. There are specific contexts in which governmental
bodies have extensive control over the processes that drive internal corporate
reform. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission has power
over listing requirements that exchanges may want to impose on issues like
board diversity.222 But many mechanisms do not require active involvement
from the federal government. The federal government also may not be able
to maintain a consistent and effective opposition to an internal reform.
Congressional inertia may prevent the introduction of new legislation. As
evidenced by the Biden Administration’s reversal of the Trump
Administration’s policy, different administrations may have different views,
preventing effective executive action. Any regulation will also have limited
scope. If climate risk will impact actual financial returns, or if ESG-focused

https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/laws-andregulations/laws/erisa/statement-on-enforcement-of-final-rules-on-esg-investmentsand-proxy-voting.pdf.
220
See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at
72,850 (rejecting view that “fiduciaries should be permitted to consider the
potential for an investment to create jobs for workers who in turn would participate
in the plan”); id. at 72,867 (“the fact that an investment . . . arguably promotes
positive general market trends or industry growth” does not imply that it “is a
prudent choice for retirement investors”).
221
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 218.
222
See supra notes 87 to 90 and accompanying text.
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investors raise the cost of capital for polluters, even the Trump rules would
not prevent consideration of pollution in investment decisions.
As a result of these dynamics, the unavailability of an external reform
may not mean that the government will intervene to prevent an internal
reform. Political actors in Congress and the executive branch may not be
willing to adopt appropriate external regulations, but they likely also lack the
will and capacity to fully defend the status quo by preventing internal action.
Conclusion
Shareholder primacy theorists have begun to assert that advocacy for
internal corporate reforms is dangerous because it has the potential to
interfere with better external reforms. But these claims are undertheorized
and difficult to square with recent experience. Internal and external reforms
have historically proceeded in parallel, in part due to the presence of multiple
actors with their own agendas, powers, processes, and constituencies.
Reformers themselves are reasonably savvy, and are unlikely to accept a weak
internal reform as a substitute for a better external reform. Internal corporate
governance reforms can also support external reforms by leveraging
corporate power over the political process and changing facts on the ground
in a way that supports external regulation. These dynamics are reflected in
the current debates over racial justice, climate change, and the power of
institutional investors. At present, there is little evidence that reformers face
a stark choice between internal and external reforms to improve corporate
conduct.
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